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# CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

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VOL.

### WINTER 1948

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# CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

VOL. 1

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# **EDITORIAL**

THE editorial note to the first number of CONTEMPORARY ISSUES called for the establishment of a world movement for a democracy of content. Con-TEMPORARY Issues is no more intended as a complete or "finished" production than is the democratic movement, but is envisaged as arising under public control." In this process the writer is at all times responsible for his conduct and ideas to the public, and the reader is responsible for criticism and other ideational intervention: that is, writers and readers interchange through a profound and thorough dialogue. In this way much that is indispensable will materialise. Attention will be drawn here only to the most important of these features: (a) education of the writer by the reader and vice versa; and through this, and the active participation of all those interested which it involves, a growing ability to work toward (b) proper clarification of controversial questions, and (c) breaking down the dictatorship of the editorial office, which is detrimental to the free development of reader and writer equally. Practical demonstration on the basis of active public control will not only show that the accomplishment of these tasks is possible, but also that everything which grows out of the principle and practice of mutual responsibility can alone furnish the guarantees for building a real democratic movement, and not one which will again deteriorate into a leadership-apparatus and deceived members. But to begin with it is only necessary that the public in its intervention should not restrict itself to any one type of contribution but should make use of all forms: articles, reports, documents, newspaper extracts, etc. The process of the interchange of contributions has already begun in the third issue of Dinge der Zeit — a magazine with which we are in close association. We have every reason to look forward to a similar development soon for Contemporary Issues.

But bound up with and growing out of the need for public control is a further task: the assimilation of the utmost variety of material. As a public magazine Contemporary Issues will seek to investigate and mirror the interests of the whole public. In order that the most advanced sections of the whole of society shall participate in such a movement — and the aim for effective democracy is nothing short of this — it is necessary for our magazine to deserve the name "all-sided." In it every important special field of human endeavour and interest must be brought into relation with every other field. That one man can only be a specialist in one field and that his responsibility is to this field and not to society as a whole, has become the overmastering and disintegrating movement of modern life. The need is to integrate public consciousness for public responsibility through the proper co-ordination of unnaturally separated intellectual and practical spheres of interest. The strength of the democratic movement will be

dependent on the degree of all-sided public collaboration.

Owing to delays occasioned by transatlantic collaboration and distribution, the second number of Contemporary Issues appears too late for publication in the United States as an Autumn issue. Readers should note, however, that this will not affect their annual subscriptions and that they will be sent four issues.

# Geoffrey Quilter

# BRITISH DEVELOPMENT AND THE

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OR the first time in the history of British politics the election of 1945 brought Labour to power with a strong Parliamentary majority. Hitherto Labour Governments in Britain had been based on minority representation in the House, as in the MacDonald Governments of 1923-24 and 1929-31. Such Governments were dependent for their day-to-day support upon the Liberal Party or other unstable parliamentary blocs. The history of these early Governments was one in which the main tenor of their political and economic practice came into marked contradiction when compared to their avowed aims, a breach between promise and performance which discredited them in the eyes of the public and led to their eventual downfall. But in both instances the fact that they were minority Governments was ready to hand as an over-riding excuse, and the reasons for failure could "quite easily" be described as due to the nefarious practices of an Opposition. But history has changed this. The "reasonable excuse" which was the good fortune of previous Governments has been denied to the Labour Government of today. They were put into power on a basis of unquestionable authority, to carry out an unambiguous mandate. Any anomalies between the terms of this mandate as promised in their electoral programme and their practice during the past three years is the responsibility of the Labour leaders alone. Any accounting which indicts, and we shall see that the discrepancies between the programme and the practice are indeed great, is an accounting which involves them directly in every detail.

But we must guard against misunderstanding. The development of the Labour Government takes place inside the framework of Britain's general age-old economic demise. What the Labour leaders inherited was a national economy on its last legs — an economy which had pretty effectively been squeezed out of world trade relations, and, robbed of adequate outlets for profits, had increasingly reduced and ruined its productivity in many The whole previous history of capitalist relations is responsible for this. But the responsibility of Labour enters in at the point where they failed in their promise to break the vicious circle of production for profit at home and abroad. At home they introduced legislation for organising further the backward development of our industries in the interests of capital. This is, of course, not the only way in which they reinforced and perpetuated our economic demise - the extent to which they left and organised on a private ownership "sector" in our economy would also have to be examined in some detail. But this essay is limited to the phenomenon of the growth of further capital monopoly in our midst and to Labour's responsibility for it. Political responsibility is another matter. But to return.

Undoubtedly the Election landslide was in a large part due to Labour's programme. "The main asset of the Labour Party in 1945," writes John Parker in Labour Marches On, "was the national and positive character of the approach it made to the electorate in comparison both with the appeal made

by the Conservative Party and with its own appeals in earlier years."

This approach was based on their commitment to three main tasks, envisaged quite clearly in Let Us Face the Future. In the first place the productive forces were to be freed from the paralysis of private ownership which had crippled them in the period between the wars, and placed at the service of the community as a whole and for its benefit—an extension of economic democracy to be accompanied by real political democracy. Secondly, the peoples of the majority of those countries which had lost their democratic rights during the war were to have them restored (in this respect the programme indicates all countries and does not anticipate any exception) and the political re-birth was to find its guarantee by the fullest possible integration of the economy of Britain with the economies of these countries. Thirdly, the danger must be removed of yet another world war—a feature of their programme that can merely be mentioned in an article of this kind.

The overwhelming preference which the British electorate showed for such a programme for betterment of national and international affairs, as against the demand of the Conservatives for a return to the "Free Enterprise" of the 1930s, was one of the most significant single political events in the post-war world. The attempts at totalitarian solutions in other countries in the world had been thoroughly discredited, and here in Britain in one great historical moment was the political recognition of the inadequacy of a way out of our national and international disasters on the old model of private ownership and enterprise. Moreover, the transformation of the political consciousness of the majority of a nation seemed to offer the starting point for a similar transformation in other European countries. Almost immediately in France and Italy there was a marked growth in strength of the "Socialist" movements. Had the programme of the party not declared : "The British Labour Movement comes to the tasks of international organisation with one great asset: it has a common bond with the working peoples of all countries, who have achieved a new dignity and influence through their long struggles against Nazi tyranny!" Have the last three years brought us and the peoples of Europe any nearer to our goal?

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#### FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The record of the Labour leadership is one in which they have either openly broken with their programme in practice or in which they have used their programme as a screen behind which to void their commitments of any real content for the benefit of the majority of the people. Many of the items that go to make up this dual negation of the progressive tasks are, indeed, past, old and familiar history; nevertheless, in any proper, responsible accounting it is very necessary that no important connections be forgotten. In politics we require if not the memory of the elephant at least not that of the cockroach.

The first act of the Government, carried out with truly indecent haste—even before its Cabinet had been finally formed—was to send Attlee and Bevin to Potsdam. A strange first interpretation, this, of their intention that there should be the fullest economic co-operation between nations! The economic reduction of Germany has been faithfully carried out in the four zones by the protracted but uninterrupted policy of dismantling German

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> John Parker, Labour Marches On. Penguin Books-No. 628.

industry and installations. "Freedom and abundance," Mr. Churchill had said, hymning the inheritance of the post-war world. "These are our aims. We must try and share our blessings and not our miseries." Well spoken. but only shortly after he had put his signature, together with Roosevelt and Stalin, to the formula of "unconditional surrender." Attlee and Bevin supplied the further acts to this tragic curtain raiser. They ratified the dismemberment of the country, which drove large populations off the land. The granaries of Germany — East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia — were handed over to the Polish-Russian State which, unable to populate or cultivate them. allowed the agricultural heart of Germany to proliferate with weeds. Those of the peasants who survived the "humane" eviction were driven to other parts of Germany to aggravate the problem of Europe's 25,000,000 displaced post-war people. Nor are the economic policies of the Labour Government to be regarded as an act of revenge against a single "aggressor nation" with its disastrous concept of the "guilt of a nation," but the destruction or restriction of the productive potential of the Ruhr alone involved at the outset the destruction of the indispensable unit of European economy. Attlee and Bevin had allowed their metamorphosis into the undertakers of the economy of the whole of Europe.

Nor was Labour's desertion of its political plans for the democratic rehabilitation of nations any less expeditious, and in spite of the most favourable circumstances for proper democratic reconstruction. We must remember that outside Britain the hopes of all national resistance movements concentrated themselves on democratic aspirations. Such movements, born of suffering involved in the loss of the most elementary human rights, included practically the entire populations of various countries — with the exception of the few universally hated "collaborators." Apart from the immediate task of ridding themselves of the armies of enemy occupation, they were linked with the programme of the Labour Party by the common longing, differently expressed but always unmistakable, of effecting radical changes, of breaking away from the Fascist power of the "old cliques" and

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of creating better conditions.

In the protracted epilogue of war these movements were stifled by the signatories of the Atlantic Charter, who hated nothing worse than the genuine aspirations of the masses. They protected "their democracy" against the support of all majority movements, and preferred to link themselves with the "collaborator" Darlan, the extreme chauvinist de Gaulle, with Mussolini's supporter Badoglio, and the monarchists in Greece who had called in Metaxas. The Labour programme, on the contrary, had appealed to its unity with the fighters of the Underground. Their victory in England could have been the great moment in history for the victory of their universal democratic plan. And the result? From the inception of their rule we find only the continuation politically of the foreign policy of their predecessors. continued collaboration with all the personnel of the old rule, and the steady rise of disappointed democratic hopes throughout the world as well as among the radical intelligentsia in Britain. It was precisely in those countries where Britain possessed the greatest influence that the democratic movements received the most notable setbacks. In Greece the Government placed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Quoted by J. E. D. Hall in *Labour's First Year*. Penguin Books—No. 612. All quotations are from this source except where otherwise stated.

British troops on the side of a near-Fascist régime, and in Indonesia they did everything to break the legitimate struggles of the people for self-determination. The story is familiar and sanguinary, and it finds its continuance today in Malaya, as indeed it will continue to find its repetition tomorrow in the hands of Labour.

But what of India, Palestine, where Britain's influence direct and indirect was greatest? In these countries it is certainly not a case of the Government having broken its treaty obligations with the people involved and the terms of its programme. That is correct provided we stress that the infringement was not "open." The withdrawal of British troops and the granting of independence to these nations happened right enough, and it gave the Government spokesmen a magnificent opportunity to indulge in the rhetorical language of "freedom" at which they are adepts in and out of season — but the freedom and the independence were, none the less, an appearance merely. From an analysis of the concrete historical conditions for the independence granted the action of the Government was no different in essentials from the technique to ruin nations employed throughout the two wars by Imperialist governments. At the end of World War I there was a similar creation of small independent nation States. Out of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, out of portions of the former Czarist empire, new States had been carved, but on the basis of the most tortuous State boundaries. No sooner were these small countries "free" when they fell out with each other on the question of geographic divisions arbitrarily introduced by the Great Powers for this purpose. What characterises the partitions proposed for independence in the Middle East and in India is that they violate ethnic divisions and inspire communal and pogrom disturbances under the pretext of pretending to obviate them. The history of these countries from the moment of their "independence" has been and must continue to be that of internal self-annihilation, aided by the military supplies of the Great Powers (Britain included).

Neither was the Government at all anxious to "ruin" while there remained even the smallest possibility to rule for imperialist advantage, for we must remember that the indirect colonising which the atomising of peoples involves is inferior to direct military and political intervention as far as Britain is concerned. It is an arrangement which weakens considerably the exploitative opportunities as against those of America, rich in capital and commodities for export, and Russia, with the most highly developed fifthcolumn Fascist machine for political domination. It is in this respect that Churchill was right in characterising this policy as a process of "unbuttoning the Empire" — even though it very effectively destroys what it unbuttoned. But the concessions were the outcome of Britain's inability to follow any other course. Attempts were made by the Government to maintain stubborn armed skirmishes against the national movements that they had neither the manpower nor the command of equipment or money to quell. Their programme was honoured as an outcome of weakness and the strength of the national movements, and on a basis of partition calculated to ruin the gift

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#### DOMESTIC ECONOMICS '

The Labour Party had declared its intention to nationalise basic industries in order to own the means of production on behalf of the community and for the good of the community. Mr. Herbert Morrison had said in Parliament about the proposed economic changes and development that they were to be a guarantee for "the emergence of a nation which is for the first time the master and not the victim of its industrial resources . . . of a Britain whose material resources are organised in the service of the British people." The economic democracy was to be accompanied by the maintenance and extension of certain democratic rights, of equality of opportunity, of equal rights and duties for all citizens, irrespective of sex, race, creed

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That the Government has, in spite of its vagaries in foreign affairs, attempted and to some extent carried out in its economic policy a "revolution by gradual stages" for the betterment of the majority of the nation, is a common illusion in England and elsewhere both among the people at large and among groupings of the so-called "left" who imagine themselves possessed of a developed political consciousness. The Stalinist-Fascists adopt a similar position whenever it suits their power politics. Doubtless, conditions in Britain have improved for certain "sections" of the people in many cases shorter hours and better wages and conditions, as in mining and agriculture for instance. This no one would wish to dispute, though in the general development these palliatives must be short-lived. But it is at the same time incontestable that there is also an accumulation of burdens (and these not limited to "sections" of the community, unfortunately) — an alarming increase of the national debt and taxation, a steady rise of prices, and an overall planning of production and distribution on the basis of "selfdenial" at home and "scarcity" of consumers goods. The much-praised benefit of "socialising" the means of production carries along with it, as an inexorable twin, its contradiction in the form of planned economic disabilities. It is the task of this essay to attempt to understand this contradiction (for if we do not understand and overcome it we will be ruined by it in time), a contradiction which involves both the foreign and domestic policy of the Government, making for the paradox of "public ownership," which has nothing whatever in common with "socialism" - but it is first of all necessary to return to a rehearsal of further facts, in which we will confront the reader with the concrete economic content of the legislation which has "socialised" sections of industry. It is of paramount importance, in order correctly to understand Britain's economic development, to learn to distinguish between the "form" of the so-called economic revolution and the actual concrete "content" of this revolution. Looked at from the formal point of view, the propagandistic point of view of the Government through which it voids its programme of every democratic benefit, we are confronted with a gradual collectivisation of certain industries in the hands of a Parliament democratically elected. But we must not allow these features to lead us astray, or rather we must see how they stand in relation to the concrete facts we amass in response to the fundamental question: collectivisation in whose interests? Once we pose this simple question the mystery disappears, and the actual terms of the Government's industrial and other legislation are clearly seen for what they are, as made up of carefully devised schemes to protect and assist the interests of capital and not those of the public. Or to put it positively, from the point of view of the consumers, that is, of the majority of the nation whose interests economic democracy is supposed to protect, we readily discover that the terms of the nationalisation

measures are detrimental and bear down on them in ways that can only become more disastrous as nationalisation finds its extension to other industries. Analysed with the stress on the content, nationalisation is nothing more than the further concentration of the means of production as State

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The Labour Government lost no time in getting down to their task of economic reform. With admirable "efficiency" and with a boldness which reminds us, and quite rightly in this connection, of the colourful piracy bound up with the early stages of capitalist development, they drew the Bank of England, coal mines, gas and electricity, civil aviation, transport and many important features in the distribution of products and raw materials. into the elaborate legislative mesh of nationalisation. Truly remarkable, the ferment and the stir at No. 10 and in the House displayed on the side of economic democracy by those gentlemen whose zeal in foreign affairs had been it consistently against the democratic struggles of the peoples. But one notorious feature of nationalisation was that most of the sections chosen in the economy were characterised by technical obsolescence, under-capitalisation, and were all, further, more or less in trouble about maintaining a respectable profit margin. A rehearsal of the facts to demonstrate the parlous condition of the businesses taken over by the Government sounds very much like an undertaker's dirge. Coal mining was in a crisis. In order to avoid flooding the market the mine-owners had restricted expansion during the interim war period. Output had fallen steadily and the labour force, having to work under the most primitive conditions, had dwindled. The vast majority of the pits were in a state of exhaustion. Electricity and transport were badly in need of re-equipment and standardisation. Aviation was insufficiently subsidised and running at a handsome deficit. Mr. Hall, in Labour's First Year, succinctly expresses one of the recurrent pre-conditions for the programme of nationalisation when he writes about the coal mines: " The whole industry needed reorganisation from top to bottom at a cost which private enterprise was neither able nor ready to meet." Bankruptcy is the recurrent danger signal for programmes of nationalisation. In these instances the State had to intervene and get down to the task of shouldering somehow its glorious burden, irrespective of whether Mr. Attlee or Mr. Churchill directed it. In fact nationalisation is not a distinctive feature of British economy introduced by the Labour Government — it is alone the scope and the tempo of the feature that is new, and this is a symptom of the gravity of Britain's economic decline. For instance, nationalisation measures were introduced in the past in our water supply, in the electrical supply industry, partially in civil aviation and in the B.B.C. — and for identical reasons. In the same way the Bank of England had for decades served the needs of the State and followed the directions of the governments in power. In the latter instance the Government merely put "public" to what had been already established, and it utilised its nationalisation schemes in the other instances for further economic assistance. Nor is the process of nationalisation limited to Britain alone - although the term "socialist" used to describe it is a piece of deception patented by governments who pretend to be "left" - Stalin's Russia is the greatest first offender. The process towards nationalisation is to be seen in France, Brazil, Mexico-all the countries within the American sphere show a similar development. Even Sweden's "middle way" is assuming more and more the same pattern.

The general development of "statification" is an indication of the general decline of the whole capitalist system, which is forced to write off more and

more unprofitable enterprises as public burdens.

Nationalisation measures must be regarded as, among other things, constituting direct financial relief for the private producer. Mr. Morrison thad said: Private enterprise begins to feel that it cannot be enterprise without the State behind it." A large part of the terms of the nationalisation is calculated as financial relief to those sections of private enterprise most in trouble. Quoting Mr. Morrison again: "Where we socialise fair and proper compensation will be paid." We will return presently to the innocent little words "fair" and "proper." It is necessary first to indicate the terms of compensation, and the arrangements made with the shareholders of the Bank of England are as good as any. The Treasury took over the existing stock of the Bank, the insignificant sum of £14,500,000, and for every £100 of share capital issued £400 of share capital in the form of Government stock at an interest rate of three per cent. Such an arrangement increased the share capital by four times (£58,000,000) so that the rate of interest on the original capital was at 12 per cent. Moreover, the Government protected the old owners against competition and guaranteed them against all financial loss. In the coal mines we witness another interesting phenomenon. The mines, on purchase, were not declared to be the property of the "people" immediately. A period of "investiture" or "interim ownership" for two years was allowed to the old owners under the direction of the Coal Board. So far, this period has been admirably used by them to draw off further capital resources in the form of writing off money previously set aside as a reserve fund for taxation, running costs, etc. declared in June, 1947, as additional dividends. (The Times.) That the compensation is "fair" to the producers is in fact misrepresentation — the spokesmen for the Government have indeed an admirable sense of understatement on matters affecting advantages to private enterprise in their legislation and of rhetorical emphasis for the supposed benefits to the public! However. To demonstrate just how irresponsible the terms of the compensation are it is enough to recall what makes up "fair" and "proper" business practice without the "socialist" label. When an enterprise gets into difficulties because it has paid out too much in dividends and put too little back for building up the industry (the condition of enterprise nationalised) the old capital is written off as a loss and a clean slate is made for new capital. Where such capital is not forthcoming the industry is written off as bankrupt and dealt with in accordance with the laws of bankruptcy. Had the Government felt anything more than rhetorical regard for the interests of the public it would have proceeded in the normal way. Compensation would have been worked out not in terms of an arbitrarily inflated figure (the speculative figure on the Stock Exchange) but in terms of the real value, if any, of the assets taken over. Wherever, as a result of past neglect, the cost of re-equipment is in excess of the value of the whole concern, this is to be regarded as a deficit for which the industrial companies have already over-compensated themselves in the form of dividends withdrawn. But the Government in its great love for the Old Masters was deeply concerned to pay off the capital on their basis of computation. Such "social benefits" constitute nationalisation in the interests of capitalist ownership and at the expense of the public. The State-controlled administration must in the first instance earn the interest on capital. One of the many ugly chicks hatched by the Government "as compensation" has already openly come home to roost in the recent declaration of the profit and loss account of the coal mines. The alarming deficit of £25,000,000 includes significantly the

figure of £13,000,000 due to the old owners.

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But what is involved in the process of nationalisation is not exhausted by drawing attention to the "compensation" involved, though this is a handsome bonus to the old enemies of our economy, and which continues to contribute detrimentally to the recovery of our industrial life. Nor is the whole story told by drawing attention to bankruptcy as an essential precondition, or, what is the same thing, to the chronic state of under-production in the industries nationalised. There is a further important feature in the develop-ment towards "public ownership" which requires examination. In this process the Government is the willing tool which brings about the further concentration of industry in the hands of the concentration of industry in the hands of capital in the form of State monopoly. In this process the Government takes the place of the old industrialist, who, in order to protect his capital investment, goes after it by entering himself directly into the process of production. This is the role now assumed by the Government, mainly the Cabinet, and the sub-committees, boards and managerial staff appointed by it. They enter in on behalf of the "public" at a time when the industrial risks are at their apogee. Through their entry and the terms of the nationalisation they convert the last, mainly fictitious, vestiges of the old capital into benefits that accrue to capital in the form of interest, security, etc. And they attempt to do this in the purest or most ideal form by guaranteeing the capital against loss of interest from competition and other factors.

I have stressed the industrial risks which the Government has willingly taken upon itself. From the basis of chronic under-production in the industries nationalised springs the rapacious necessity for the ever-increasing use of capital investment. The Government are not only the guardians of capital but its brokers in industry. They borrow more and more capital for industry on behalf of the community. They are indeed the sworn enemies of idle money, one of the periodic diseases contracted by the City. Not only were huge amounts of invested capital abroad (the famous invisible exports) lost through the mounting destruction of two wars, but competing nations, especially America, have steadily closed the most profitable channels for its investment. At the outset of Labour's term of office Mr. Bevan had expressed concern at the vast mass of accumulated money available to building and other societies. Not only has Labour managed to siphon off much of this as share capital in State enterprise, but it has made big inroads

into it for loan capital.

Hugh Dalton had exalted at the close of Labour's first year: "The credit of the British Government now stands so high that we are able to borrow money more cheaply than has ever been possible before. In fact the Labour Government is a good risk, and the City recognises that fact." Nor is the process of raising capital at interest limited to State gambles. In the "private sector" the Government has set up "Working Parties" in order, among other things, to estimate the amounts of money necessary for subsidising this sector. For example, a central organisation called the

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in "London Letter": Politics, December, 1946.

Cotton Council was to be set up by the Government to ensure the prosecution of the plan in textiles. For capitalisation of this sort the Government had made provision in the "Borrowing Bill," whereby it had empowered itself to guarantee loans up to £50,000,000 in any one year. We shall see presently that the inroad of money borrowed by the State into the private industrial

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sector is inevitable in the modern decline of production.

From our analysis so far it would appear that the Government is in the process of establishing in our industry a giant monopoly in the interests of capital. The failure of the "socialists" to "disown" capital in our exhausted industries and to "conscript" it for other industries has had and will have the most unfortunate consequences. Such nationalisation can only result in further crippling our country's economy. Its extension to steel and other industries can only extend and aggravate the process. In spite of its pretences the Government has approached no nearer to the goal of economic prosperity than it had to the goal of safeguarding the democracy

of the peoples of the world.

But how in the process of "socialising" the means of production does the public enter in? Earlier it was pointed out that the Government in its monopoly on the direction of industry has to earn the interest on money borrowed. The main source for this interest is a levy on wages and industrial production through taxation. We live in a period when taxation bears down on the nation as a whole with the weight of a mountain. Along these lines the development can only be in the direction of the transformation of the British people into a debt-enslaved nation. Already in 1944 before the advent of the Labour Government it was estimated that every child born inherits a debt of £400. But Labour has done nothing to stop the process. The ever-increasing burden of taxation is the inevitable concomitant of the ever-increasing need for capital in the economy of our country. This is what I had in mind mainly when I wrote: "The much praised benefit of 'socialising' the means of production carries along with it, as an inexorable twin, its contradiction in the form of planned economic disabilities." The devastating inroads of this contradiction, and the "benefits" arising from it for the public, can best be grasped in terms of its effects on the productivity of industry. The content of the Government's taxation on "less favoured' industries depletes and exhausts still further our productive potential.

The economy of Britain is characterised by the steady decline in the value of the pound at home and abroad, and the co-relative of mounting prices of consumers' and capital goods. The inflationary spiral is an open secret carefully guarded by Government officials, but not so the increase in the prices of necessary goods imported. This latter is an explanation which stands always at the heart of Labour's apologetics in connection with the problem of the "gap." It is essential to take this feature in relation to Government taxation policy for industry in order to understand the extent to which their " socialist" measures are eating up the productive resources of the country. The Achilles heel, or, if you like, "the last twist of the knife" in the Government's attitude to industry is that, in assessing taxation, they stubbornly refuse to admit any change in prices of fixed industrial assets (machinery, etc.) since 1939, and do not make flexible allowances for fluctuations in the price of current assets (raw materials, etc.). Such an attitude means, in effect, that the Government policy is slowly consuming necessary capital for industrial production as follows: For the proper prosecution of industrial enterprise it is essential for industrialists to set aside adequate reserve funds for replacement of industrial equipment. But with a steady rise of purchase prices replacement requires a corresponding rise in the reserve funds. When such a corresponding rise is blocked the result can only be the constant reduction of the means of production: "To take a simple example — that of a road transport company. Imagine that it originally had fixed assets of four trucks and that these cost £500 each, and that at the end of five years these trucks were worn out, fully depreciated, and had to be replaced. If by that time new trucks of the same capacity cost £1,000 each, the money accumulated through the depreciation fund would buy only two trucks instead of the previous four and the operations of the company would be reduced to half."

The same is true of the replacement of current assets. The Government policy which in this connection depletes replacement is the attempt to fix prices for the sale of finished products (not a benefit always handed out to the consumer), which makes it increasingly difficult for the industrialist to recover a sufficient profit margin on sales to replace raw materials at the mounting purchase prices. To quote again from the Lever Brothers report: " [Industry] consumes and replaces its raw materials several times in a single year. If, however, it is to retain its normal productive capacity, in charging its raw material it must apply the same principles which I have indicated should apply to fixed assets; namely, it must recover in its selling prices the value of the materials it has consumed. This value must be the replacement cost, for if there were a continuous rise in the price level a recovery of the original cost price would only permit replacement by ever-diminishing quan-The flow of production would be progressively hampered until ultimately the business could no longer be carried on."2 The hopelessly inadequate fixed levels for replacement naturally mean increased revenue for the Treasury. Any capital accrued or set aside in excess of the outmoded replacement figures is creamed off as surplus by the Government. It is estimated that in this way the Government adds to itself in additional revenue from between £150,000,000 to £200,000,000 yearly.

The quotation from the Lever Brothers report has been given in order to indicate concretely the contradictions between the demands of capital and those of production — in the direction of the further decline of our economy — but this does not mean that we must identify ourselves with the aims of industrialists who believe that a return to the good old days of private enterprise is still possible through taxation reforms. The reverse is true. Protection of the interests of capital means the sacrifice of all other interests including the industry of this country. The State is the greatest single enemy of the whole of society. We must recognise the political implications of this. In the general economic development towards increased starvation in the field of consumption as well as in the means of production larger and larger sections of the total population, whatever their individual reasons for it, come into a life and death struggle against statification. The mechanisms of the State are producing a nation-wide reaction against it — as the State encroaches on the heterogeneous freedoms, it generates discontent throughout

the tones and half-tones of the social scale.

2 Ibid.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lever Bros. Company Meeting Report. Economist, August 28th, 1948.

In the effects of taxation on industry we have put the scalpel on one of the sorest spots in an economy based on ever-increasing assistance from capital. The more the Government socialises bankrupt industries, the more it subsidises declining industries in the private sector, the more it participates in social insurance schemes, the greater will be its reliance on capital for these measures and on the increase in taxation which is one of the most expedient ways of honouring guaranteed interest — and such a policy must bear down more and more on the productivity of the country. Mr. Bevan's lament should be well understood by us. "He had invited industry to plough back increased profits rather than distribute them to shareholders." response had been very patchy," he added. No wonder. The difficulties which the Government places in the way of proper maintenance of real capital in industry, i.e. the constant conversion of money capital extracted from production into the productive process again, to maintain it at the old level or increase its productivity, drives industrialists either to withdraw from production completely by extracting everything they can in dividends (the course followed in the coal mines and other industries nationalised) the famous "flight of capital," some of it "funk" capital, but most of it used to equip industries in the colonies and dominions where production is not hampered in the same way - or it forces them to raise new capital with its increased liabilities. Subsidies to industry on the basis of raising capital are mainly used to make good failures to maintain existing industries on the basis all the time of increased costs. In this way the resources of the country are being gradually dissipated in current expenditure. accumulation does not take place. The general law which grips our economy is the increase uninterruptedly of the use of capital at interest and the diminishing process of its conversion into industry which alone can enhance productivity under capitalism.

The contradiction between the needs and interests of capital and those of production strikes naturally at the consumer as well. There is a corresponding fall in our standards of living. The Government's plan which is on the developing basis of under-production is and must be accompanied by the titanic organisation of scarcity of consumers' goods. Prices are raised in order to regulate "self-denial" in the burdensome field of consumers' demands, or alternatively, the products of production nationalised and private are rationed to the consumers. The Government's choice of the old road of protecting capital can have no other outcome but that of increasing and organising scarcity at home. This is and will continue to be another of Labour's "benefits" to the public. Nor has the story in other directions a happier ending. State monopoly, to the extent that it is unworkable production, becomes in the process the most expensive of all past forms of monopoly - not only in terms of the way in which it eats into the level of productivity. The colossal overhead costs in the form of "public" administration bear down on the consumer. On the basis of declining production and mounting costs it is a monopoly that "knoweth no bounds." It is the greatest single debtor but also it is the greatest single employer. "If, in addition to the employees in the industries which have already been nationalised by the present Government, those persons in local government service, Civil Service, both industrial and non-industrial, Police, Armed Forces and the Co-operative Movement are taken together, then rather over 9,000,000 persons out of a total national labour force of 20,000,000 will be

in mynor with "total labor fore".

employed in the public field. This is nearly a third (about 30 per cent.) of the total labour force of the country." The staff of "managers" at the top, which such an enormous ground staff has brought about, constitutes, like the Russian development, a substantial parasitic growth on public earnings in the form of self-appointed wages which have about them none of the modesty of an attempt at economic democracy. They comprise a privileged class that adds its quota to the rapacious development of eating up what is left of the fatty deposits of British production. To the lavish expenses of management must be added those of mismanagement. Monopoly on the foundation of under-production and the cost spiral becomes increasingly chaotic — a feverish stop-gap phenomenon — e.g. the difficulty of raw material and machinery replacement in industry asserts itself in bungled and interrupted production methods, and increases costs in the form of increased handling. But enough! It is only necessary to realise that the mounting costs in a system which continues to produce for profit in the private sector and for interest on money in the industries nationalised although, naturally, as the costs and chaos assert and re-assert themselves these, too, are constantly threatened - are handed to the consumer who gets under capitalism always the thin edge of the wedge. For the process of handing the buck the State has at its disposal the hardy perennial taxation... What it gives cheaply in services — comparatively low prices for rationed foodstuffs, health and other services — it recovers in the form of increased taxation. The direct costs to the consumer are deceptive and must be balanced against the indirect costs, and balanced (sadly) also against the national debt, which is a gigantic mortgage on the future earnings of the nation. It is at this end of the device that the crippling of human forces involved is seen in its depth. The Government is organising the industrial backwardness still further in the interests of capital and the debt-enslavement of the people. Once we recognise the process and the infinitely resourceful devices for it at their disposal we are in a better position to grasp the futility of "reformist" or "gradualist" movements which strive for, and limit themselves to, economic palliatives. The omnipotent State through taxation and the national debt very easily siphons back for the relief of the Treasury any economic reforms it might have granted under pressure or to keep up the appearance of being a "socialist" Government. All organisations (the trade unions included) which limit their struggles to the orbit purely of economic betterment have the dice loaded against them throughout. In this respect the State is invulnerable.

The process of monopoly is gluttonous and it is endless—super-exploitation, crises, war, etc.—but provided only that a tree grows to heaven. It is for us, through thoroughly understanding the laws and the consequences of State monopoly, to put an end to it through action on the basis of such understanding. We are confronted all over again, and it is necessary to begin at the beginning, with the tasks the Labour leaders promised to perform—that is, the introduction into our economy of production for the benefit of all. It is an enormous task but one which becomes increasingly manageable as we understand and discover the proper dynamics for rational change. Economic interventionism is not sufficient in itself. It must be understood at the outset that the only effective intervention, that which alone can establish gains with

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> John Parker, Labour Marches On. Penguin Books-No. 628.

any attributes of permanency, is *political* intervention in every struggle and in every field. Not an easy process to understand and practise, but one which it is imperative to begin to explain.

#### POLITICS

The serious anomalies already described in some detail between Labour's "promises" in their electoral programme and their "actions" as a Government in power have their source all right in the contradictions of our declining economy and in Labour's determination to develop these in the interests of the City, but the power to develop further our backward material inheritance is lodged in and finds its most powerful reinforcement in the inconsequence at the heart of our political democracy. The political rights we have are partial, fragmentary, and until we understand how to overcome these inadequacies we will continue to succumb to them. It is not enough to choose a political party to represent us within the existing framework of Parliamentary representation. Such representation reflects and is devised to reinforce the economic inequalities at the base of society — the division between those who own and execute and those who are "put upon." In the structure of parliamentary government provision is made for a working distinction between executive and legislative power — whereby the former has the only real control and the latter — in England the remainder of the Commons - " formal" and mainly effete consultative rights, those of discussion, grievance, debate. The rights of criticism in our parliamentary government are allowed free play and a role in the affairs of State to the extent that they do not represent any real danger. In the case of the Labour Government the unequivocal pressure of the working masses for a "socialist" programme carried a doubt with it as to the extent of the pressure the whole of the elected assembly in the House might bring upon the affairs of the Government. The vacillations in conduct both of the executive of the Labour Government and the Opposition during the first days of the new régime were a reflection of the extent to which the landslide in favour of "socialism" on the part of the people had taken the Government aback. It was necessary for the executive firmly to curtail the effective pressure of the majority of the assembly. This the Government, having recovered its equilibrium, proceeded to do. Mr. Morrison moved on behalf of the Cabinet the suspension of the rights of private members to introduce Bills — a right usually conceded in less dangerous assemblies. In this way the parliamentary breach between executive and legislature was ratified, but with a tightening of the screws. As one member put it: "I might just as well be a stuffed exhibit in the Natural History Museum." Henceforth the destiny of the country, in spite of the usual parliamentary pretensions to the contrary, was outside the effective control of the majority of the House elected to represent the interests of the majority of the community. The established breach in bourgeois parliamentarism was re-established and the democratic interests of society were well on the road to their further effective suspension. For allowing such a breach the bulk of the representatives of "Labour" are, of course, responsible.

It is not necessary to examine the spate of legislation which gave the Cabinet, now responsible mainly to itself alone, control over finance, industry, raw materials, distribution, manpower — in the interests of capital; what we are concerned with here is the radiation outward of the breach between

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executive and legislative power to the Boards of control in nationalised industry both at the production and the distribution ends. The personnel of these Boards, as is well known, are directly appointed by the Minister concerned and responsible to him alone. In this way the industrial policy of the Boards is placed outside any possible control of representatives appointed by the public to look after its interests. The Boards are managed by the same old business men in the same old interests but in a new guise, with an admixture of some leaders of trade unions who have already become a part of the managerial aristocracy. Sir Stafford Cripps, at that time head of the Department of Trade, had asserted that very few wageearners were fitted to take any part in the administration of industry, and that any "joint production" schemes must be considered as consultative rather than managerial.1 The same "rule from the top down" in the House — an inequality like a sore embedded in our "democracy"—is reflected in the public bodies in production and distribution. Wherever it has been found necessary to decentralise control outside the London area the same pattern has been adopted. The regional and district councils, which in a more militant past had been electively established by the people, are now instituted from the top. The Government's sole vision for the future conduct of decentralisation in State services — electricity, transport, education, health, etc. — has been nothing more than the election of local public representatives in an advisory capacity. Throughout sizeable portions of the tissue of our economic life, in the form of State services, democratic "control" of elected officials has been suspended. Everything is concentrated in the hands of arbitrary executives.

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But the provisions for undermining our political democracy run much deeper than this. Not only are the interests of the community hamstrung by the powers of an executive, but the right of election, when it exists, does not carry with it its own completion in the form of the right to enforce " conduct " in the interests of the community. That is, we have the freedom to "vote" without the freedom to "recall" and "replace" a representative in whom we have lost confidence. This is a limitation which lies at the very heart of our "democracy" and which negates all other freedoms in the process of their fulfilment — and this is the case no matter how extensive and courageous the people's struggles for democracy. The analogy is of a business man who has the right to hire a manager or other employee without the right to fire him no matter what his conduct. On such a basis no business can be efficiently run — and least of all the business of the State. This limitation in our democracy is one of the principal reasons why it is easy always for a democratically elected Government to say one thing at the time of election and for a period of five years to indulge in an uninterrupted infringement of its word in action — to put it differently, why it is possible for us to indulge in the glorious right (a right nevertheless that must be retained at all costs) of electing representatives to misrepresent us for five years.

The democratic rights of bourgeois society are "formal" to the extent that they are incomplete. In every struggle for economic improvement, for the conduct of our society in the economic interests of the people, it is

for the conduct of our society in the economic interests of the people, it is necessary at the outset and throughout (an uninterrupted and intransigent

<sup>1&</sup>quot; London Letter": Politics, December, 1946.

feature of our struggles) to raise sharply the question of proper public control. It does not matter what the struggle, however small and seemingly insignificant, or great, we have to learn to enter always by raising alongside of it, and as its goal, the necessary political guarantees. No settlement of grievances without such guarantees amounts to anything at all, for whatever we might gain will, as we have seen, either be sucked into the quicksand of Governmental economic "devices" or nullified by the incomplete measures of bourgeois democracy. Wherever the right of election does not exist we raise it and press for representation in an executive capacity. We urge our representatives to report back to the electorate on all important matters in their particular sphere in order to facilitate a proper dialogue between them and the public on public affairs. Such is the real objective and the slightest gain in this direction is worth more than the most spectacular achievement anywhere else — to get gradually, beginning with single cases in single fields, election on the basis of proper accounting to the public and wherever necessary immediate recall. In each instance the public representative would have the opportunity to act in accordance with the wishes of his constituents in any area for which he declared himself responsible, or convince them of adequate grounds for his vagaries in practice. We must construct a democratic movement on the basis of unimpaired interchange of responsibility between those who elect and those who are elected. As our movement grows in this direction it will attract more and more people who are experts in given specific fields and prepared

for election on the basis of accounting and recall. We have already seen that Labour betrayed its promises first in the field of international democracy, and broke up the heroic resistance movements of the subjected peoples. The loss is ours and it is enormous. But the lesson to be learnt is not only negative. It is important to remember that there were such movements which demonstrated beyond doubt the powerful potential in our society towards world democracy. Nor is this all. In our analysis of foreign affairs we also observed that the advent of Labour to power set off in its train, initiated and encouraged, in spite of the leadership, struggles for democracy in more than one country. In Europe (quite apart from the colonies) there was a marked resurgence towards political differentiation in the direction of the "third force." Such a resurgence, through proper political behaviour in our country, can be depended on as an inevitable political concomitant, and we must extend to such movements all aid in the form mainly of our own action at home, but also in every practical and ideological detail. It goes without saying that public control at home for an economy in the interests of the majority cannot be maintained for any time or completed without the economic and political aid of similar democratic movements elsewhere. The economy of Britain is the least self-sufficient in the world — a devastating reality that presents itself ceaselessly under capitalism in the form of the problem of the "Gap." A proper national democracy can only complete itself internationally. movement we should create ourselves inside the spirit of internationalism and work towards the letter. But this does not alter one iota the recognition

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that the starting point for real democracy is at home.

# GERMAN RESISTANCE TODAY

EDITORIAL PREFACE

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AMONG the articles published in the first number of CONTEMPORARY ISSUES was a statement on "German Resistance—Today," by Pastor Adalbert Knees. In a notice of our magazine, the Times Literary Supplement of July 31 commented as follows on the article: "The strongest criticism is contained in a lecture by the German Pastor Adalbert Knees, which its author communicated to the Allied Military Government and which is here reprinted. He accuses the allies of having departed far from Christian principles in their treatment of defeated Germany, and asserts that 'Christianity is being misused incessantly to cover a policy which is both imperialist and capitalist.' It is right and necessary that, three years after the war, German opinions—and discontents—should be given currency, though when Pastor Knees goes so far as to say he can 'discern scarcely any difference between the political methods of the Third Reich and those of the capitalist democracies,' he invites the reply that there is this difference at least: his lecture appears openly in print."

We publish below Pastor Knees' reply in an unabridged translation. It is only necessary to add that the Pastor's indictments of the Allied Military Government in Germany, both in his first pamphlet and in this letter, have been speedily verified by his arrest on September 13 by the Military Government. The arrest took place after a meeting of refugees from the East which he addressed. What the reasons for the action of the Government are we are not yet in a position to state, or rather the authorities have not yet announced these officially at the time of our going to press. For instance, in the Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (Bochum), September 23, it was reported: "The British prosecutor asked to have the accused remanded in custody until September 24 as the prosecution had not yet made up its mind," but the Press has widely disseminated "its" conjectures for the incident-among which is the quite preposterous allegation that the Pastor had earned 15,000 Deutsch marks from the sale of pamphlets. The allegation has been denied by his friends. In a letter to the Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of September 16, Mrs. Gusti Hassenpflug wrote: "I know exactly the situation of Pastor Knees who enjoys the hospitality of my house. Since the currency reform he has not received any cash income either from donations or from the sale of any pamphlets. Pastor Knees, who is himself a native of Koenigsberg and therefore homeless, devoted all his love and all his strength to the poorest of the poor, that is, to the refugees and sufferers from war damage." The only comment on this published denial was a remark that the allegation had been taken from the German Press Service—the editor left it at that.

Pastor Knees, on being refused bail, according to the same newspaper, protested: "This does not conform with my feeling of what is right." The response of the judge was: "I am not interested in your feeling of what is right." Knees was remanded in custody. To date, we have received no further news, but quite evidently, the case of Pastor Knees raises issues in which every democrat is deeply involved. All readers who are concerned about the right of freedom of conscience are invited to write to us.

# OPEN LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF "THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT"

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Sir,

In your issue of July 31st you have exercised a moderate, yet not very relevant criticism of my writings and particularly of the lecture "Is that Christianity?" which I delivered on July 19th, 1946. For the sake of better understanding, please permit me now, on my part, to deal with your remarks. I am not so much concerned with consistently countering your "English" point of view with my "German" one. I am rather concerned with arriving at a higher and generally human point of view on which we can meet freely and beyond all political prejudices. To what extent it will be possible for me to overcome the limitations of my German nature, I cannot judge. In any case, please accept these words as an attempt in this direction.

In general it seems to me as if you were treating the very serious, even deadly serious problem with a certain levity which is ill-suited, in my opinion,

to your great moral responsibility.

Not that you contradict my own point of view, not that you blindly refute my attacks against the Allies' policy ! - Quite the contrary, you do not contradict. You even acknowledge the necessity of German opinion being freely uttered, and I therefore could not wish for a better justification of my attacks against Military Government than the one you give me. It is simply your way of doing this, the nonchalance with which now, "three years after the war," you concede me the right to speak for Germany — this has shocked me not a little. Either you do not know what has happened in Germany during those last three years . . . but you ought to know it, you ought to know much more about it than we did about the terrors which once happened in Germany behind the high walls and in the carefully guarded secrecy of the concentration camps. But then you and your people are placed in precisely that position which your indictment and the Allied judicature have for three years tried to impose upon us. The indictment is "criminal negligence toward the most brutal political methods" and "toleration of murders by the million." This indictment (it was much more sharply phrased originally) is justified! This is confirmed daily anew by the attitude to those expelled from the East and refugees.

This indictment applies no less to the Allies, applies no less to Britain and — pardon my tactlessness — to yourself. In my opinion, to pass by the death and the misery of millions with an indifference greater than yours, is impossible. Obviously you — like the major part of the European public — consider that only after a period of quarantine have the Germans the right to free expression of their opinion and, in consequence, to humane treatment.

"It is right and necessary that, three years after the war, German opinions — and discontents — should be given currency"; thus you write in a mood of generous toleration, which does not seem to be quite free from condescension.

A people which lacks the possibility of expressing its will and its opinions is — outlawed. But apart from the fact that Germany is and will remain outlawed for at least as long as the stolen Eastern territories have not been restored — don't you consider such an extended period of international arbitrariness to be somewhat too long? Do you know what can happen during three years? Do you know what did happen in Germany during those three years? Could it be that you really have not heard that fifteen million people — human beings like you and me — have been chased and whipped away from their homes in the most terrible circumstances? Could it be that you have not heard about the "ghost trains" from Breslau and their sealed cattle trucks from which frozen corpses tumbled into the arms of the German salvage teams? Have you never heard about the shocking sufferings of the city of Koenigsberg which is my home town and which is called Kaliningrad today? Certainly you have heard about all this, but it does not seem to disturb you very much.

Perhaps you will say that we have brought all this upon ourselves by helping Hitler to power. Even if that were so — one does not pour oil into a neighbour's burning house from which his family cries desperately for help. And if someone has been the cause of his own injury, one does not

tear out his tongue or cut off his legs.

Do not say that such examples of sadistic cruelty make no sense or that they are applicable only to the Soviet methods of government. The Western powers are hardly convincing when they try to point to the Soviet Union as the real cause of the present misery in Germany, without this in the least deterring them from their own measures of retribution or preventing them from carrying out a programme of dismantling the brutality and ruthlessness of which cannot be justified — unless one considers blind lust of destruction. revengefulness or boundless greed for profit as a justification. There are cases of dismantling which outrage every conception of justice and fairness and which I can never believe conform to the will of the British people. (In the Sieg district, to name only one of the innumerable examples, it is intended to dismantle all factories manufacturing tinplate, although these do not fit into any of the categories of the dismantling regulations. Practically without exception these are small or medium family-businesses, the loss of which not only would increase the lack of the most urgently needed consumption goods, but would also cast once more a considerable section of the German population into misery. In another case, in Lüdenscheid a factory which never worked directly for war purposes is to be carried away and dismantled solely in order to be reassembled for the benefit of a British competitor.) This utter irregularity forces one to conclude that certain circles within the British administration have fallen victims of corruption to such an extent that they do not shrink from large-scale frauds. Frauds there are in any case; the question is only whether you and the whole British people are prepared to assume the responsibility for them.

I cannot imagine that you have become completely conscious of this question which, after all, imposes upon you the responsibility for the misery and the deaths of millions of people; otherwise, you would not so lightly load your conscience with these three years of lawlessness and strangulation of opinion. You would perhaps have paid serious attention to my warnings, instead of resorting to an extremely shoddy evasion for the sake of a certain

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ment. rman write from For your "rebuttal" is an evasion. It is an attempt to escape the truth and to preserve, by means of a polemical last word, a prestige which you think you owe to your people. But you do not owe your people anything but the truth.

"... though when Pastor Knees goes so far as to say he can 'discern scarcely any difference between the political methods of the Third Reich and those of the capitalist democracies,' he invites the reply that there is this difference at least: his lecture appears openly in print." I cannot understand that such a pettifogging consideration can be thought to belong to the real problem. The fact that some of my writings have been published abroad (!), "three years after the war," has not much to do with the methods of world politics. It shows only that there are groups abroad who are not in agreement with the brutal policy of their governments and take upon themselves the liberty to say so. It does not demonstrate anything about conditions in Germany, except this, that one has to take the detour via London in order to be able, as a German, to express one's opinion openly. But this just reveals a surprising parallel with the Hitler regime, for the

Brown Book on the Reichstag fire also appeared in - London.

However, since I am not of the opinion that one can take a three years' holiday from the laws of humanity without suffering for it, I have published my writings in Germany since Ianuary 1046. Although the help given by the Military Government has been confined to never having permitted, but always prohibited publication with the threat of the direst penalties, I none the less gratefully acknowledge that, hitherto, they have left me my personal liberty. I am fully aware that, for a similar attitude of open resistance in the Third Reich, I would have been sent to a concentration camp long ago (just in passing: my attitude towards the anti-lewish pogroms very nearly got me into one). Here, indeed, there is a certain difference in the political methods. But it should be borne in mind, that in my lecture, I spoke of a certain similarity in methods in the sphere of world politics. This does not exclude occasional big differences between the Gestapo and the Secret Service in their methods of work. Even if this were true in my case, it does not mitigate in any way the frightfulness of the retributive measures applied to Germany. The theft of the Eastern provinces, the looting of Germany, the abuse of de-Nazification, the pauperisation of professional soldiers, the misery of millions and millions — what has all this to do with my fate?

At the most that I could enjoy a certain "personal liberty." This liberty, however, looks vastly different from a distance, from London, for instance, than from close by. It was and still is at bottom an extreme lack of liberty, in so far as general conditions in Germany were almost insuperable limits to my activity. Why send me to a concentration camp when I am already

in a — concentration camp?

It was so easy to put me "into cold storage." Just a little tightening of the thumb-screws. One refused to give me a licence. That meant complete inactivity. The whole of Germany was in a psychosis of fear of de-Nazification and of Military Government. No printer took the risk. Then there was the lack of paper. Even for the needs of everyday life, there was no paper. I had no money, since the Church authorities had, in January 1947, suspended and soon afterwards dismissed me without payment in consequence of my aggressive attitude. This was my "liberty." That I could break through it, that I succeeded at last in having my writings pub-

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Bra F lished, was due not so much to the benevolence of Military Government as to the extraordinary courage of a printer and to the support of a circle of

friends which soon formed itself.

I could explain to you in terms of all sorts of admonitions, prohibitions (with the threat of serious consequences), summonses and searches that Military Government does not look at my activity and above all, at the publication of my writings, with such a democratic calm as you assume. Every conceivable effort was made to discover the printer and, only a short while ago, perhaps under the impact of the publications in London, after a search lasting two hours, the major part of my private belongings was seized and secured — a somewhat belated measure, after I had succeeded at last in publishing my writings abroad.

This is how the liberty looks which we have today! It is still very dear in Germany. But I do not complain of that. Liberty, if it is to be genuine,

has to be dearly fought for.

But I do complain that once more liberty is being abused for arbitrariness and excess, and that the spirit of Versailles threatens to destroy the last possibilities of a sincere understanding among nations.

This spirit of hatred and destruction should arouse our opposition. Herein lies our common responsibility and that of all genuine humanity in

all nations.

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In this responsibility resides that higher and generally human point of view which we may all need and in which I tried to meet you — I hope not in vain—freely and beyond all political prejudices.

PASTOR ADALBERT KNEES,

August 28th, 1948.

Bielefeld, Oberntorwall 13.

### **Cuckoo** Dismantling

Washington, October 17th (A.P.). The role played by cuckoo clocks in the European Recovery Program is a perplexing one, Paul Hoffman, director of the Economic Co-operation Administration, told a Press conference.

"One of the biggest questions" in the current debate over the removal of German plants as reparations is the matter of dismantling a cuckoo-clock factory in Western Germany, Mr. Hoffman said. "Personally, I am in favour of cuckoo clocks," he added.

N.Y. Herald Tribune (Paris edn.), October 18th, 1948.

#### Hitler Unmasked

Munich, October 17th.—The personal fortunes of Adolf Hitler and Eva Braun have been confiscated by a German de-nazification court.

Hitler was declared a major Nazi offender.

N.Y. Herald Tribune (Paris edn.), October 18th, 1948.

### Paul Ecker

# JUGOSLAVIA — FIRST RUMBLE OF THE COMING STORM

W ITH the rebellion of Tito and the entire Jugoslav Communist Party, Stalin has been vouchsafed his first glimpse into the abyss. As in the case of Hitler, the oppressed nations constitute the crack which threatens to bring the whole edifice to the ground. And if the creature who provides the first push turns out to be an ignorant despot who was reared within the very walls of the Kremlin, then this only demonstrates that there is irony as well as justice

in history.

The deep roots of the sudden Belgrade-Moscow antagonism are not lost upon Stalin himself—he knows only too well that the Jugoslav revolt threatens to start a chain reaction throughout his entire Balkan empire. Thus each local GPU leader hastens to warn his party that potential Titos must be purged from the ranks. But, alas for Stalin, the Titos cannot be exorcised. Their spectres will continue to hover over Eastern Europe until they take on flesh and blood, for they are both infinite and nameless. The very scoundrel who today denounces heresy from under the protection of Moscow's umbrella may be working day and night to create a situation where he too can take a stand. Stalin's point of greatest apparent strength has

become the point of his greatest vulnerability.

The immediate motivation for Tito's opposition is simply the desire of the Jugoslav ruling class to be free of the more onerous restrictions imposed upon a subject nation by an imperialist power, while still retaining its place within the general Russian orbit. In this respect Jugoslavia's stand is broadly analogous to the struggle of Indian capitalism against Britain. There is no question but that Tito desires to keep the differences on this level. That this is impossible, however, is equally indisputable, for Russia's empire is held together by threads of iron and not of gold. Far from being able to supply a satellite ruling class with needed industrial equipment, Stalin knows only how to take and take. In the plaintive words of Branko Babitch, pro-Tito Slovenian leader, " . . . Jugoslavia has given to her eastern friends wheat, fats, wine and cattle and has received in return only 'fifth columns.'" And Jugoslavia is the least of the "contributors." Czechs go without shoes, Poles without coal and Rumanians without oil in order to satiate the boundless appetite of their "eastern friends." If today Gottwald, Pauker, Dimitroff and the rest are denouncing Tito instead of emulating him it is only because they had the misfortune to come riding into power on Russian tanks, from under which shadow they have as yet been unable to crawl.

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For the struggle on its present level, Tito's strongest weapons are his military state and its secret police, which are being rudely but effectively turned against their tutors. But these weapons retain their value only because they are backed up by a far more important if less tangible phenomenon:

the people's hatred of Stalinist oppression. This is what gives Tito the strength that enables him to stand up to a far stronger police state without bringing catastrophe upon himself. The ambitions of the Jugoslav ruling class have entered channels parallel (but not identical!) with the needs and desires not only of the people of Jugoslavia, but of all Eastern Europe. Although he ill fits the role Tito has become a rallying point for the hopes and aspiration of trampled peoples. It should be clear that the Czech crowds, for example, who responded to a parade of Jugoslav athletes with cries of "Long Live Tito" were inspired by something other than that martinet's radiant personality.

Instinctively people take advantage of cracks in the prison structure and do what they can to drive the wedge in further. This is what haunts Stalin and what kept the dispute simmering secretly for so long. Only at the point where the Kremlin's entire authority throughout Eastern Europe would have been called into question by further temporising was Stalin forced to reveal the spectacle. Unfortunately, as always in such circumstances, the remedy generates a still greater danger. There lies the tragedy for Stalin—

that despite himself he must act as pall-bearer at his own funeral.

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It has not taken long for further evidence of this to emerge. In an attempt to recoup the losses sustained as a result of the Jugoslavian revolt and to bring Tito to his knees, Stalin has ordered his various Eastern European clerks to institute a thorough economic and political boycott against their former "brother democracy." Unfortunately some of these gentlemen find themselves in the position of the farmer who is called upon to boycott the country general store. First and foremost in this classification are the rulers of Albania, a country which is almost wholly dependent upon Jugoslavia economically and militarily. For precisely this reason Stalin demanded that Albania be the first to sever all normal relations with Jugoslavia, even though this severance could be little more than a pin-prick to Tito. Weaning the baby slowly would have been too dangerous; it had to be ripped forcibly from the mother's breast lest the attachment became too strong. arbitrary action precipitated a first-class crisis within the Albanian Communist Party; thousands of members, including leading governmental figures, lined up with Tito and were summarily purged from their posts. That this "solution" of the situation is far from satisfactory is a fact that Stalin least of all can fail to notice. As time goes by, the Kremlin's suicide battalions are less and less likely to relish their appointed tasks and will cast about for the nearest exit. The trail has been blazed; it may very soon become welltrodden.

The root difficulty for all oppressor nations is not primarily the chewing or the swallowing, but the digesting. The stifling of a nation, its economy and its resources cannot be accomplished by a single act, but, since it is not endemic, must be constantly reaffirmed. From the beginning it meets with resistance, passive if not active. This resistance takes place on different levels: there is the resistance of the privileged strata (Pétain, Tito) which is one thing, and there is the resistance of the people (France, Poland) which is quite another. Nevertheless, the two levels interpenetrate and are mutually influential. A schism at the top opens a crack through which popular action can pour, and, on the other hand, mass resentment provides a fertile field for manœuvres by those at the top. A moment's reflection will show that Tito's

resistance would never have seen the light of day without the knowledge, on the part of all concerned, that Russian military action against Jugoslavia would be met by a mass uprising and would have less possibility of success than the German. The secret police, to be sure, are Tito's first line of defence, one which permits him to return the Cominform's missive to "healthy elements within the Jugoslav party" with the imprint "Address Unknown." But this weapon can have its effectiveness only because behind

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the shadow lies the substance.

There is in general a widely current political predilection to invest such manifestations of crude and open force as secret police, totalitarian terrorism, etc., with an aura of invincibility that is anything but justified. Indeed, it is a minus rather than a plus sign that is indicated for these phenomena; they are the surest indications of centrifugal tendencies which require to be held in check by extraordinary means. A ruling class which is able to rule with the consent of the population (as is often possible) does not invoke methods of terror which are not only expensive but also dangerous. Those analysts who regarded the riveting down of Stalinist power in Czechoslovakia as a manifestation of its support among the population could not have been farther from the truth. Why anyone should imagine that after three years of "soft" Stalinist police rule the Czech people should be enthusiastically in favour of pulling the rope tighter around their necks is difficult to understand. It is somewhat superficial political thinking that is impressed by the inspired and conscripted parades and demonstrations conducted under the approving eyes of the police while true manifestations of popular sentiment such as the protest of the Prague students are broken up with guns and clubs. This trend of thought is but a "respectable" blood brother of the vile ideology that holds the German people responsible for Hitler and declares the Russians to be masochists who require rule by terror. The truth of the matter is that after three years in the saddle, during which time the Czechs had more than sufficient opportunity to taste the benefits of the "new democracy," the Stalinists could not afford to risk an election not controlled one hundred per cent. by the G.P.U. Otherwise they surely would have waited for the elections to give them the mandate to sweep the last cobwebs of the Benes-Masaryk "opposition" out of office. It was in order to forestall the serious danger of an electoral defeat that Stalin-Gottwald cast aside all democratic pretences. The lid has been jammed on, but the defiance of the Sokol organisation shows that the pot has not ceased to boil.

The catastrophe is as inevitable for Russia as it was for those who like Hitler went before, and as it will be for the United States, which will come after, for it is impossible to maintain the entire world, or any considerable part of it, in a permanent strait-jacket. Every regressing capitalist nation with the requisite power must make the attempt, but each, though it may come closer than the last, must fail, for all its weapons are double-edged. If each capitalism, in order to survive and dominate (which become more and more synonymous) must stifle all competition, destroying or alienating industry and providing the severest restrictions on economic development, this is all the more evidence of the necessity and viability of that which it must artificially seek to destroy. It generates resistance everywhere and must rely increasingly on the use of crude force. Capitalism was at its strongest when it was carrying society forwards and required a minimum of force

since it needed only to take advantage of the "natural" economic laws. When it has to resort almost exclusively to force in order to throw civilisation back it is in reality at its weakest, its strength is reduced to dead weight. A growing tree will burst through a concrete sidewalk, but iron staves will

not avail a dying one.

The debacle of capitalist democracy and the decline of the organised labour movement has produced the situation in which centrifugal tendencies in world economy are expressed in the form of a progressive and mandatory nationalism against the "internationalism" of imperialism. This "internationalism" in turn is the result of the complete interdependence of world economy in its present stage of development. The tendency towards unification of world economy is compulsive. Since it has failed as yet to find a progressive solution on the only basis possible, through world organisation formed across international lines in the interests, not of one sector or another, but of the largest common denominator, the tendency is expressed in the horrible caricature of "internationalism" à la Stalin, Hitler and Truman. Each ruling class seeks to bend the economy of the entire world to meet its own particular needs - hence Hitler's "New Order," Churchill's "United States of Europe," Stalin's "new democracies," all of them capped by the overweening "Pax Americana." Reaction reverses its colours (for as long as it is convenient): Count Sforza chides Ghandi for his lack of "internationalism" in seeking independence from British rule, and the glorifiers of Ivan the Terrible indict Tito for "reactionary nationalism." This "internationalism "becomes the "co-operation" of master and slave which, as always, does violence to the interests of the slave. Revolt against this new slavery must inevitably find itself under the flag of nationalism, and it is indeed only an "international of rebellious nationalisms" in co-operation with one another against national oppression that can lay the basis for the resurgence of a genuine internationalism.

September 1, 1948.

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#### No Man is a Hero to his own Valet

Last week there appeared in the Yugoslav Communist paper Borba a definitive series of articles on the Yugoslav position. The three articles were unsigned. They may have been written by Marshal Tito himself. In any event, they certainly appeared with his approval.

. . . Well, says the writer, Premier Stalin may be the greatest living

authority on Socialism, but he isn't infallible.

N.Y. Herald Tribune, October 13th, 1948.

# S. J. Wyndham

# OUTLINE FOR A CRITICAL APPROACH TO T. S. ELIOT AS CRITIC

I

AS poet and critic Eliot has firmly established himself during the period of two world wars, and his work reflects directly and indirectly the tyranny of destruction as the diabolical figure in the carpet of the age through which we are living. I am not concerned with the obvious connections between the self-annihilation of nations in the process of material and cultural destruction and the ardent "Waste Lands" in Eliot's poetry and thought. It is perfectly true that Eliot is the contemporary malingerer, the sensitive individual in a quandary, what in America critics designate a feminine sensibility (William James rightly called it the opposite of tough-minded) and his poetry is the record of it - but this has been developed and redeveloped by others into a tradition of sensitive platitudes. What is of interest for my purposes is that Eliot in the process of his thought as critic (I use the word widely to include his opinions both literary and sociological) has become the victim, the passive reagent of, and the protagonist for, the catastrophic backward movement of our civilisation. In this he stands at the head of contemporary culture. The movement p not, of course, simple, but characterised by uneven and combined development in the material as in the cultural expression, retaining some of the progressive features of past historical achievement but not as decisive. In Eliot the progressive features are only weakly retained and operate in his criticism as confusions of thought mainly - as unconscious instruments of thought, contradictions, ambivalence in the form of fair-mindedness, evasions, etc. The revenge is retrogressive inroads into our consciousness. I begin with one of the main contradictions in his thought of which he himself is not aware.

Miss Bradbrook writes: "His essay on Dante has been followed not only by a considerable general interest in Dante, but by a cult of the later Middle Ages which threatens to become as monotonously vociferous as the cult of the metaphysical poets. It may be summed up in the slogan 'The Renaissance didn't happen.'" Such a statement is very true and will form a main part of my theme. But it is equally true that Eliot's methods in literary criticism would not have been possible had the Renaissance not happened. And how could this be otherwise? Eliot retains, in spite of himself, the progressive contributions of history in the habits of his thought, though he is not aware of it. He has succeeded only in turning the clock of his mind back in a series of verbal utterances and recommendations, whereas in the instrument of his thought as critic he is in fact making use of methods of thought introduced by the Renaissance and subsequently developed. I have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Essay on Eliot's Critical Method included in T. S. Eliot — A Study of his Writing by Several Hands. Dobson, 1947.

principally in mind the phenomena of differentiation in the field of thought

and abstraction in the *mode* of thought.

The Renaissance was not yet a period in which there was any marked degree of differentiation in the different disciplines of thought. By and large, it was still the era of primitive capital accumulation when much was still fluid and homogeneous. Bourgeois society had not yet created its elaborate division of labour to which the elaborate division of culture corresponds. But what was truly formative in the intellectual life of the time were ideas and movements *towards* specialisation. "Reason and love keep little company nowadays," said Bottom. The divisions of labour and thought were being inexorably introduced — the secularisation of the State and morals; the establishment of science, economics, politics, philosophy, as separate and autonomous disciplines. From this point of view the history of the Renaissance exists in our society to-day in full-scale completion.

Eliot treats literary criticism as a specialised discipline. He has "inflexibly supported the autonomy of poetry" and defined literary criticism as a "view of the relation of the work of art to art, of the work of literature to literature, of 'criticism' to criticism."2 His earliest essay "Tradition and the Individual Talent" is a brilliant development of his view. He has persistently tried to think out the boundaries of literature, what in itself it is, what the distinctive attributes are which make it an identity. Such an approach is really the mainspring of his best observations on the practice of reading and writing poetry — it has contributed a wealth of textual analysis, rediscovered for us very fine poets, established unsuspected literary links between various poets, improved our taste as readers. In fact, Eliot's prose style, at its best in the Selected Essays, is an invitation which involves the reader in the process of literature as literature. Nowhere does he supply statements or feelings about literature which we are required to bring to bear on the text from the outside. He knows very well, to quote I. A. Richards in another connection, how "to distinguish an intuition of an emotion from an intuition by it."3 His method and his prose presentation reduce the distance between the poem and the mind. He involves us in a process in which we grow into the poem — or very nearly.)

But to return to our critical analysis. Eliot is nowhere aware that his method as literary critic is in direct contradiction to his idealisation of the Middle Ages. The progressive contributions of the Renaissance are retained as a central confusion. Mediæval modes of thought and response are the antithesis of Eliot's. They were instruments for the construction of a Weltanschauung or total view of the universe; concepts like Being and Essence, Cause and End, were employed throughout to put everything in relation. Whereas specialisation is the movement of thought which achieves everything out of relation, whose "basic canon is identity, a simple reference of each attribute to itself." Nor does Eliot realise that his own merit as critic carries with it its own disadvantage, also as the direct historical contribution of the Renaissance. While it is true that we cannot think clearly without differentiation, without grasping each stereotype in its own isolation, yet we must succeed in thinking wrongly unless we are at the same time

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<sup>1</sup> Thid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Selected Essays: The Function of Criticism.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted by Eliot in The Use of Poetry.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Science of Logic. Hegel.

aware of the limits of differentiation. "The error lies in forgetting that to abstract is only one half of the process, and that the main point is the reunion of what has been parted." The error of specialisation vitiates his thought. He thinks literature as an entity, a thing in itself, into its own impasse, where in many places he puts unscalable fences about it. He does not see literature in relation to social man but in relation to itself. In this way he disconnects poetry from everything else. He takes special pains, for instance, to disconnect it from philosophy, psychology, and belief, in many celebrated passages. In criticising Coleridge on the relation of belief to poetry he quotes I. A. Richards as coming "very patly to our help":

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"It is better to say that the question of belief or disbelief, in the intellectual sense, never arises when we are reading well. If unfortunately it does arise, either through the poet's fault or our own, we have for the moment ceased to be reading and have become astronomers, or moralists.

persons engaged in quite a different type of activity."2

The persuasive ingredient in this formulation is, of course, the authority and practice of the capitalist division of labour, whose ideology is that of the expert for the job, of one man one job, the alienation at the heart of our society. The tyranny of specialisation has induced Eliot to pose the whole problem of the relation of our responses to poetry to our responses to other knowledge and experience wrongly. Knowledge, of whatever sort, is not the province exclusively of the specialist responsible for it—the astronomer, the theologian, the moralist. There is a very real sense, surely, in which knowledge is made available for non-specialist assimilation, and what is the relationship then? Eliot's approach makes it impossible for him to formulate the question correctly, let alone make an attempt to investigate it. His critical practice is best versified by himself:

"On Margate sands I can connect

Nothing with nothing."

It must be remembered that in demonstrating the influence of specialisation as the main core of Eliot's thought I was mainly concerned with its misuse that in him leads to the absence of any awareness of the indispensable and dynamic connections between poetry and other knowledge. The connections are empirically given in every society. Poetry is a process produced by man and stands in active relation to his other processes as a real man in a real society. Once you separate or peel it off at the points of growth what you have left is a dead body or object (for your pleasure or contemplation) about which you merely predicate relations. You may arrive at a statement of poetry as connected, but it is purely descriptive or mechanical, and a matter of arbitrary opinion and prejudice. It is not an accident that Eliot's contribution to literary criticism "must surely be noted rather in the history of taste than in the history of ideas."

The historically progressive content of Eliot's thought finds its transformation into intellectual backwardness, where taste is put in the place of thought in the conception of literature as the organised interchange of "matters of opinion." Once you lose the connections how can this be otherwise? It is a type of moderate irrationalism — and here we enter into the main theme, that of the retrogressive development in our time. Eliot's

1 Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> The Use of Poetry.

<sup>3</sup> Miss Bradbrook in the essay on Eliot's Critical Method.

approach as critic is one which drops out of our consciousness the great achievements of history, which slips back in its practice to already overcome and outmoded approaches in literary criticism. It was one of the substantial achievements of the Romantics in the nineteenth century that they did battle to overcome the debilitating practice of their immediate predecessors who had fallen into the vacuum of "matters of opinion" merely. practical pettifoggers who recommended and described merely their favourite "giraffe." They sought to establish (mistakes notwithstanding) the principles or foundations of literary criticism, to make literature amenable to and explicable on the grounds of rational demonstration, in terms of the psychological structure of the personality and in its relation to the physical world. The forward development today is a continuation of the task as they conceived it, insisting, of course, on demonstrating the connections of literary criticism with society, that is, with the forces of production, forms of intercourse and consciousness, which are the bases of society. But inadequate as it was, the achievement of nineteenth-century criticism was none the less solid. Linked as they were with the great thought of the revolution in France and the upsurge of philosophy in Germany, they were rationalists who sought a rational foundation for their thought. The movement was, of course, political — the rights of reason connected with the concept of the inviolability of the individual in the bourgeois democratic revolution. It is the going back on the great tradition of European rationalism. on the rational foundations of their thought and on the principle of democracy in society, which is the disease in contemporary culture, and to which everything else contributes in the cultural demise. The retrogression is connected with the first World War which for the first time obviously introduces the process of the self-annihilation of nations and the destruction of the hardwon material basis of our civilisation. It is not accidental that the ideologist for the suspension of reason in literary criticism as in everything else (of militant irrationalism and fascism) was the soldier-philosopher T. E. Hulme.

About Eliot's irrationalism there is nothing militant. "Why should the aged eagle stretch his wings?" In him the process is gentle, cunning and insidious. It operates rather through the suspension of the requirements of rationality than in any more positive form — unlike, for instance, the vorticist critics and poets, or Herbert Read or Middleton Murry. Moreover, the device-he uses to induce his readers to void their minds of the requirements of reason has the appearance of reason. It operates with the shell or form and the kernel alone is bitter. Throughout his criticism he establishes the machinery of "fairness" in judgment and deliberation, but the manner of its operation leads either to the suspension of both or to the ventilation of prejudice. In those parts of his work where Eliot as critic employs the device to suspend the prying demands of rational justification he is little more than the "book-keeper" of literary criticism whose attempt is to arrive at a satisfactory "balance of accounts." His statements are merely normative

and cautionary here. I quote a characteristic example:

"My purpose has not been to examine thoroughly any one type of theory of poetry, still less to confute it; but rather to indicate the kinds of defect and excess that we must expect to find in each, and to suggest that the current tendency is to expect too much rather than too little, of poetry."

The Use of Poetry.

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Such an approach requires no effort of thought and belongs less to the province of thought, for which a foundation must be offered in some view of reality, than to the domain of taste where anybody's opinion is as good as anybody else's. It is the grey no-road of thought. But the "fair" or "open" mind is used most often by Eliot as a convenient screen for the introduction of bigotry and prejudice (mild forms of irrationalism), but it is here, none the less, that his practice as critic has connections directly and by implication with politics. The "fair-minded" attitude, the demand that each should have its turn, achieves for him the right to entertain sympathetically, reactionary movements in history and contemporary society. It is in fairness to totalitarianism that it has to be admitted that there is also something to be said in its favour:

"If then, Liberalism disappears from the philosophy of life of a people, what positive is left? We are left only with the term 'democracy,' a term which, for the present generation, still has a liberal connotation of 'freedom' and 'democracy.' But totalitarianism can retain the terms 'freedom' and 'democracy' [for whom? S.J.W.] and give them its own meaning: and its right to them is not so easily disproved as minds onflamed by passion [the better word would be 'concentration camps' S.J.W.] suppose. We are in danger of finding ourselves with nothing to stand for except a dislike of everything maintained by Germany and/or

Russia."

In a note to the passage just quoted he writes about General Fuller, one of the two British visitors invited to Herr Hitler's birthday celebration, that "In my opinion (he) has as good a title to call himself a 'believer in

democracy 'as anyone else."

But it is not (however reprehensible) what Eliot has to say either for or against totalitarianism with which I am directly concerned. After all, he does not so much commit himself to these ideas here, as to the right to entertain them in "fairness." What we have to recognise in him and guard against in our own thought is that the phenomenon of the fair mind is as baseless as it is without limits - it is irrational to the extent that it does not involve choice on a rational basis. It is that playground of thought in which there are no rules and which admits in everything. It must therefore not surprise us that Eliot has on occasion put his signature to progressive documents, as in the case of the trial of the anarchists some time back, where the demand was for the right of free speech, or in his preface to The Dark Side of the Moon where he embarks on an onslaught on totalitarianisms both German and Russian. The open mind knows no contradictions (it is not rational), and to think with its mechanism is the shortest route towards the neutralisation of intelligence where we are " in danger of finding ourselves with nothing to stand for." It is apparent from Eliot's use of it that "fairmindedness" can both misrepresent and betray; it can void history of anything positive as it can fill it with reactionary alternatives. To-day, especially, it is necessary for us to recognise its nature. In the period of the catastrophic decline of capitalism, where the political movement is ever in the direction of the enslavement of nations and peoples, the "open" mind is most easily enslaved. Committed to nothing and admitting in everything it is passive and easily capitulates to what is the strongest social pressure.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Idea of a Christian Society.

The open mind can be nothing more than a victim to the retrogressive process. In it the progressive features of Eliot's thought and behaviour cannot be decisive.

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So far we have only touched on the movement of Eliot's thought backwards. In actual fact it is a capitulation to the retrogressive development which requires us to think ourselves out of the possession of many centuries of growth. Eliot's standpoint throughout as literary critic is that of the Anglo-Catholic with the historical preference for the Middle Ages as the idealised base. But we must not be so unfair as to expect him, even in connection with his most confirmed beliefs, to dissipate the impression of open-mindedness that at all times he is anxious to preserve. We have already observed how effective an intellectual ground it is for reaction. It is also very effective in making the edges of his religious views look pretty, which he does by the multiplication of qualifications (evasions) that give an impression of fair thinking and have — as he hopes — the salutary effect of allaying the reader's suspicions that his thought and judgments proceed under the pressure of prejudice. Notice Eliot's eagerness in the following quotation to placate us on the question of his beliefs:

"I may as well admit at this point why is it a question of having to admit your thought processes? S.J.W.] that in this discussion of terms I have my own log to roll a mild term indeed for the defence of reactionary positions S.J.W.]. Some years ago, in the preface to a small volume of essays, I made a sort of summary declaration of faith in matters political, religious and literary.1 The facility with which this statement has been quoted has helped to reveal to me that as it stands the statement is [not reactionary! but S.J.W.] injudicious. It may suggest that the three statements are . . . of equal importance to me, which is not so; it may suggest that I accept all three beliefs . . . on the same grounds, which is not so; and it may suggest that . . . they all hang together or fall together, which would be the most serious misunderstanding of all. That there are connections for me I of course admit, but these illuminate my own mind rather than the external world; and now see the danger of suggesting to outsiders that the Faith is a political principle or a literary fashion, and the sum of all a dramatic posture."2

How magnificently the declaration of a set of reactionary faiths has disappeared in a volley of qualifications! Good relations, it seems, have now been established with his readers and the Faith can be left to exercise its influence on his critical opinions underground. How many in my generation, taking Eliot seriously, have been misled into pronouncing and defending wrong literary judgments while what his literary criticism "was meaning all the time" was a defence of the Faith. It is with this surreptitious use of religious interests that I am immediately concerned.

It is important to relate Eliot's strictures on certain poets and critics to his religious preferences for the Middle Ages in order to understand better how his mind as a critic works. The connection is steady and continuous and could be sharply and correctly described as an attempt to rewrite literature

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Sacred Wood. To the effect that he is an Anglo-Catholic in religion, a Royalist in politics, and a Classicist in literary criticism.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> After Strange Gods. [Italics mine. S.J.W.]

in order to put the Middle Ages in its place. Toynbee has recently attempted the task for history in which the development of our human society finds its falsification. Eliot's literary criticism is the prologue to his later sociological books; it creates in advance an atmosphere, a climate of literary judgment, that will make us more receptive to an open recommendation of the religion of the Middle Ages. His judgments throughout as literary critic fall into the development backwards. Most of the time the work is of course oblique. Throughout it will be noticed that the poets, critics and thinkers castigated (the disapproval is in these cases sharper in the "book-keeping of the fair mind "— it hums with overtones — than the approval) are those writing at moments of revolutionary change in history and expressing the superstructural relations with the historical advance towards the present century. In this way Donne, living at the time of the primitive accumulation of capital, and who responded to the progressive movement of history by relinquishing Catholic ideology, is written off as the "Billy Sunday," the "Magpie," etc. The attempt is to encourage a condescending attitude towards his thought. In the same way a damp attitude is encouraged toward Milton, some of whose magnificent force was a response to the Puritan Revolution that was the ideological form the bourgeois political revolution took at the time. Of course, the Romantics come in for a heavy fire of irony, and pity, and condescension. The revolutionary content of their thought, coinciding with the French Revolution and the industrial revolution which completes the introduction of the higher, modern modes of production an d the new division of labour in the social relations, is unquestionable, and it needs a really big finger in the dyke to write history backwards. Nor does Hegel, who has dangerous connections with Marxism, escape Eliot's attempts to put his readers off. As against this continual disguised work of undermining the reader's possible sympathy for those poets, critics and thinkers who have responded to the stream of modern history at its decisive moments, is the more sympathetic recommendation of the contributions of those men whose lives coincided with periods of historical stability or who had the ideas of moderation and the status quo — the Elizabethan critics gathered around the Countess of Pembroke, Dryden, Samuel Johnson, Matthew Arnold, etc.; recommendations, of course, achieved through the doubleentry system of book-keeping. The figure in the carpet is Dante and the Middle Ages, disguised throughout by the genuflexions of the fair mind. Once we get a firm grasp of the underground interplay of Eliot's thought in its devious and tortuous detail we have rendered intelligible the seminal connections with literature of his religion and politics, which Eliot wrongly maintains "illuminate my own mind rather than the external world."

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I would like to examine in some detail the culmination of Eliot's beliefs in The Idea of a Christian Society. In it the recommendation of the Catholic way of life as a society close to the model of the Middle Ages is put forward in its most unequivocal form. But it is not done without equivocation, and it is this process in presentation, or the use to which he puts abstraction in his mode of thought, that I wish to examine. I cannot here do more than assert that the method of thinking through abstractions was a principal intellectual contribution of the Renaissance and refer the reader for its detailed development to A. N. Whitehead's Science and the Modern World, especially to the chapter on the eighteenth century. In spite of ideological somersaults Eliot in this respect owes much to the Renaissance.

But he abstracts badly. Bad abstraction simply means to take out one or more elements from a total context and by mislaying the rest of the context to give to what you take out a false independence or individual concreteness. It is what Marx searchingly analyses as "fetishism" and Whitehead has aptly called the "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness."

Eliot approaches the Christian society from a highly abstracted point of view. He is not writing about a Christian society but about the "Idea" of such a society. "Something," he elucidates, "that can only be in an understanding of the end to which a Christian society, to deserve the name,

must be directed." And in the note to this sentence he writes:

"In using the term 'Idea' I have, of course, had in mind the definition given by Coleridge, when he lays down at the beginning of his Church and State that: 'By an idea I mean (in this instance) that conception of a thing, which is not abstracted from any particular State, form, or mode, in which the thing may happen at this time or that time; nor yet generalised from any number or succession of such forms or modes; but which is given by the knowledge of its ultimate aim.'"

In other words Eliot's approach to Christian society is teleological, a test of

that society in terms of its ultimate aims.

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It is not without some misgivings that I examine Eliot's approach to Christian society within the framework of my own notions. I am well aware that in his appendix to his little primer on modern heresy, After Strange Gods, among the four examples of heresy to inhabit his privately constructed "Purgatoria" is one from Mr. John MacMurray, who had the temerity to adopt a position that I am about to take up here. It would be

best to quote an extract from the sinful passage. He writes:

"I must therefore preface my criticism by saying that I accept the rejection of idealism and the principle of the unity of theory and practice in the sense in which I have expounded it. And since this is the truly revolutionary principle, such an acceptance involves taking one's stand within the tradition of thought that derives from Marx. The negative implications of accepting this fundamental go very deep. They include the rejection of all philosophy and all social theory which does not accept this principle, not because of particular objections to their conclusions, but because of a complete break with the assumptions upon which they are based and the purpose which governs their development. They involve the belief that all theory must seek verification in action and adapt itself to the possibility of experiment."

The interpretation of any society (past or future) from the point of view of its avowed aims alone, the taking of these in abstraction from the other elements that go to make up society is not only something that I cannot accept, inside the framework of which I see no point at all even to begin to think (if it is a society we want to think about), but it must be characterised as a childish and immature way of thinking about history. Its main purpose (or so it seems to me) is the desire to keep the party clean. Eliot by adopting his extremely abstract approach to his subject is able to void his analysis of all those elements which have usually embarrassed most Christian apologists for Christianity. As Fr. Demant (quoted by Eliot) has put it: "The fact which renders most of our theories of Church and State irrelevant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Idea of a Christian Society.

is the domination of politics by economics and finance "1 (an apposite description of the society we live in, but which Eliot designates as "neutral!"). Abstraction in Eliot's mode of thought has enabled him to rid his mind of the embarrassing cargo of his theme. "It should be obvious that the form of political organisation of a Christian State does not come within the scope of this discussion. To identify any particular form of government with Christianity is a dangerous error." But it was the Church itself in the Middle Ages that indulged in the "dangerous error." It is healthy when we read Eliot's exercise in abstraction to remind ourselves that for more than a thousand years the Christian State and Church had uninterrupted leisure for practising what it preached. I need not underscore the brutal chasm which existed throughout between its ideals and its practice. It is a notorious historical fact that no contortions of idealisation can do away with. In any case we are already too much steeped in the bourgeois conception of history which we had better rechristen as "an arithmetic of broken

promises.'

But even Eliot is not as childish as at first sight may appear. A Christian society looked at entirely and only from the point of view of the "Idea" obviously would not satisfy him. He is not interested in that sort of evacuation of the content of history and roundly speaks against "a surrender of the faith that Christianity itself can play any part in shaping social forms."3 Nor is Eliot unaware of what the social forms of his Christianity would look like. He expresses a dim though ambiguous recognition "that Christendom has remained fixed at the stage of development suitable to a simple agricultural and piscatorial society." He might also have gone on to say that the heart of the social ethic of mediæval Christianity, its hierarchical structure. can be sought in the relations between peasants, lords and prelates in the mode of agricultural production. But he does realise that the agricultural form must be modified. But whatever the modification it is a pretty good guess that Eliot does not intend it in any extreme form where it might upset the social ethic subscribed to by the Church. His Christian society would have a solid basis in agriculture to which he has feelingly committed himself in After Strange Gods. The context in which the passage I am about to quote appears is one in which he expresses his sympathy for the reactionary agrarian movement in the South of America (we should remember here that agriculture in the South is based on negro pauperism as in the Middle Ages it was based on serfdom) as expressed by a group of writers in I'll Take My Stand. He writes:

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"I know very well that the aim of the 'Neo-agrarians' in the south will be qualified as quixotic [Eliot really has a genius for missing the point ! S.J.W.] as a hopeless stand for a cause long lost before they were born. The American War of Independence and the Emancipation of Slaves! S.J.W.] It will be said that the whole current of economic determinism is against them, and economic determinism is to-day a god before whom we fall down [the bourgeoisie do S.J.W.] and worship with all kinds of music. I believe that these matters may ultimately be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Idea of a Christian Society.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>+</sup> Ibid.

determined by what people want; that when anything is generally accepted as desirable, economic laws can be upset in order to achieve it." The return to an agrarian type of economy would not "upset" economic "laws" but would transform productive relations in modern society into the more backward and lower productive relations of pre-capitalist or feudal society. It would require full-scale material backwardness. I had thought that what was necessary to-day was the transformation of existing relations of production on to a basis of higher productive relations where economic democracy is possible. But apparently not!

On the question of the agrarian foundation of the Christian society, Eliot, in saying the little he has, has of course violated the highly abstract manner on which he was intent in considering such a society. But we find that Eliot quite often repeats the violation, though in the same ambiguous form, when from time to time he indicates the political basis for the ideal society

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"We have no assurance that a democratic régime might not be as inimical to Christianity in practice, as another might be in theory: and the best government must be relative to the character and stage of intelligence and education of a particular people in a particular place at a particular time."2

What the other political regime is that is inimical "in theory" is not at all difficult to guess at in a book where statements like the following occur

frequently and in quite an ordinary way:

"We conceal from ourselves, moreover, the similarity of our society to those which we execrate: for we should have to admit, if we recognised the similarity, that the foreigners do better. I suspect that in our loathing of totalitarianism there is infused a good deal of admiration for its efficiency."3

But what we must understand and grip firmly in our minds is not merely that the veiled preferences which Eliot shows for totalitarianism are those of our Christian gentleman, although this is sufficiently reprehensible and must be made public and condemned — for instance in the following extract a Christian refurbishing of totalitarianism brings out the impression which it tries strongly to create that further objections would be trivial:

"The fundamental objection to fascist doctrine, the one which we conceal from ourselves because it might condemn ourselves as well is that it is pagan. There are other objections too in the political and economic sphere, but they are no objections that we can make with dignity until we set our own affairs in order. There are still other objections, to oppression and violence and cruelty, but however strongly we feel, those are objections to means and not to ends [a nice distinction indeed S.J.W.]. It is true that we sometimes use the word 'pagan' and in the same context refer to ourselves as 'Christian.' But we always dodge the real issue." +

What emerges is that he envisages totalitarianism as the proper political form for his idea of a Christian State in practice. This is the real content of the backward development of T. S. Eliot as of the retrogressive movement in our contemporary society.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> After Strange Gods.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Idea of a Christian Society.

<sup>4</sup> The Idea of a Christian Society. [Italics mine. S.J.W.]

So far I have written throughout inside the critical limits imposed upon me in this essay. I would like now to absolve myself from the restriction and adopt a sympathetic attitude which I hope will be helpful to Eliot. I would suggest that the herculean labour of rewriting history to get back to the mediæval basis for his Christianity could easily be spared him. The backward movement of capitalism in the period to-day of its decline has caught up with the backward movement of his thought and is engaged in establishing on an international scale the totalitarian basis necessary for his "Idea" of a Christian society. In Spain the construction of a Christian State on totalitarian foundations is already well advanced, and Franco, as far as Eliot is concerned, would doubtless be an encouraging patron of letters. Or a trip to Russia or any part of the huge slum Empire of Russia would provide a much shorter route than the method of equivocally backsliding to the Middle Ages. But this brings me to the heart of our contemporary tragedy—the bitter and protracted agony of retrogression.

An observation of Miss Bradbrook's is again helpful in this connection. About the Dante essay she has written that it was "one of the first signs of a new movement in England; Mr. Eliot proved himself here at the growing point of his generation." I suspect that Miss Bradbrook is quite innocent of the profundity of her remark, nor is it in fact apposite unless we interpret the phrase "growing point" to mean a growing backwards in the development of contemporary consciousness. To understand Eliot in the backward movement of his thought towards the Middle Ages we must bear in mind that as poet and critic his appearance and development was between two World Wars. The first World War marked that catastrophic historical moment when the international contradictions in the capitalist mode of production could alone attempt their solution by a forceful "re-division" of the globe where economic competition of the major countries had already reached absolute saturation. The earlier solutions of expanding capitalism through the less sanguinary subjugation of minor and non-capitalistic countries was a pattern whose exhaustion was final with the outbreak of world wars. We live in a period to-day where the catastrophic "solutions" are on the foundation of the brutal elimination of major countries by each other. Germany and Japan, once mighty producers of commodities for the world, are bloodily pushed back into the backward and benighted orbit of colonies, while Russia is colonising further huge tracts of the globe. The retrograde movement, in international dimensions, is uninterruptedly towards the self-annihilation of capitalism as a form of the production of wealth, and the political form which accompanies and attempts to bolster up the explosion in the material base is towards the enslavement of whole nations and peoples through totalitarianism. Simply, totalitarianism is the bourgeois political form that their contradictory (now bankrupt) economic base generates and requires in ever-increasing violence. Whole nations and peoples are violently torn out of its own body — out of a share in the wealth of the world — and as massed slaves exploited on the most wasteful basis. In developing backwards towards the Middle Ages as the source of his ideas dogmatic, irrational, authoritarian, and having their material source in serfdom. Eliot is supplying in advance the ideological needs of capitalism in the retrogressive movement. It is in this way that Eliot has swum, as a victim, with the stream of capitalist development and come out slightly ahead of it at the "growing point of his generation." He is not alone in this process.

## "IF WE MUST DIE . . . "

Last spring A. Phillip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, astounded the whole of American official society with the declaration that he would urge American youth, both Negro and white, to refuse to register for service in the armed forces as long as racial segregation persisted. This forthright declaration threw down a novel challenge to the powers-that-be. It was followed up by organised action. Early in July the "League for Nonviolent Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation" was formed and launched a nation-wide drive to obtain pledges from Negro and white youth to refuse registration. Sympathy was immediate. Of 2,000 Negro college students polled by Newsweek Magazine, seventy-one per cent. pronounced themselves in support of the League's stand. Opinion was widespread that an actual majority of the politically aware coloured population was in sympathy with the movement. Despite the stiff fines and jail penalties facing those who failed to register, response to the request for pledges was significant.

Subsequently Randolph abandoned the movement which he had initiated, for reasons which must be analysed at some later date. Although dealt a severe blow by this defection, the movement did not collapse. With the exception of Randolph and Grant Reynolds, the entire leadership of the League stuck to its guns, reorganised under the name of the "Campaign to Resist Military

Segregation" and continued its campaign.

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We print below excerpts from a statement issued by the League which strikingly state the case for civil disobedience to the draft. Regardless of the ultimate degree of success which the movement may achieve, it is an event of the greatest importance that in this period of reaction a group of men and women have had the courage to stand up against the threats and denunciations of ruling officialdom and to call upon one of the most harshly oppressed sections of society to rise in "direct action" against its continued enslavement. The echoes of this call are likely to ring for some time to come.

The fight against Jim Crow in the armed forces has been going on continuously for more than twenty-five years. In World War II Negroes literally caught Hell—and since that time those who have called for the end of segregation in the Armed Forces have met with official hedging, rebuffs and some outright opposition. On March 30th A. Phillip Randolph told the Senate Armed Services Committee: "... this time Negroes will not take a Jim Crow draft lying down.... I personally pledge myself to counsel, aid and abet youth both white and Negro to quarantine any Jim Crow conscription system, whether it bear the label of universal military training or selective service.... I shall call upon all veterans to join this civil disobedience movement."

This blunt, sober statement split the issue of army segregation wide open. Heated discussions began in pool-rooms and churches, bars and classrooms—even in Congressional halls. Senator Wayne Morse called it treason; P.M. Editor Max Lerner called it historic. Whatever they said, most people

recognised that the Randolph proposal was a real expression of the deep resentment Negroes have to Army Iim Crow — but — what about "civil

disobedience"? What about breaking the law?

Obviously such an extreme form of direct action as civil disobedience could never be justified until there had been a long-suffering campaign to wipe out military Jim Crow through education, negotiation, arbitration and legislation. Such campaigns have been waged for thirty years. Since before World War I Negro and white organisations, delegations and leaders have used these methods to little or no avail upon the Army brass hats, Presidents and Congresses. Even though the President of the United States instructed Mr. James Forrestal, Secretary of Defence, to remove segregation from the Army, Mr. Forrestal has refused to put the directive into operation. The Republican Presidential Platform said in 1944:

"We pledge an immediate congressional inquiry to ascertain the extent to which mistreatment, segregation and discrimination against Negroes who are in our armed forces are impairing morale and efficiency, and the

adoption of corrective legislation."

These same Republicans recently failed to support Senator Langer when he attempted to outlaw segregation and discrimination recently on the Senate floor. Senator Taft and other Republicans fought to table civil rights amendments to the draft, this even after Taft had written A. Phillip Randolph that he would support such amendments. Thus again the Senate

voted to continue Jim Crow.

As late as April the Government stated through Secretary Royall that it was the intention of the Army to continue Jim Crow. It is no wonder that the fifteen Negro leaders left after saying they could not act as advisers to such a programme. What is there left but direct action? So it would seem that after almost thirty years of almost futile dependence on Congress and various Presidents that direct action and civil disobedience are absolutely

necessary to progress.

To take a civil disobedience stand against all segregation at once, no matter how desirable, would be an impossibility in practical terms. Therefore, even though we make it clear that we are unalterably opposed to Jim Crow everywhere, for tactical and strategic reasons it is necessary to select carefully those areas in which one can work successfully, and then to select one given area in which to concentrate. It seems that there are several reasons for concentrating on Jim Crow in the Army, as a means to eradicate Jim Crow widely:

(1) Surveys have shown that Negroes are more emotionally aroused about Army Jim Crow than by any other single issue. This may seem strange, but during the war every Negro family was crushed by Army Jim Crow through the intense humiliation of their husbands, sons, brothers and sisters in the armed forces. This is an important fact, for in selecting the area of concentration it is essential that those encouraged to resist "be keenly conscious of a flagrant wrong to them."

(2) The eradication of Jim Crow in the Army automatically moves towards eradication of segregation in many other areas of life. The Army is now America's largest and most influential business concern. It touches almost every other economic, social and political institution. If the millions of Negroes and white people in the Army are in mixed units they will eat, travel and sleep together. They will have recreation

together, work together, and travel on boats about the world together. In the South they will live, sleep and work together in and beyond Army camps. What could be a more revolutionary blow to the caste system? How under these circumstances could Jim Crow survive? Civil disobedience is certainly not un-American. In American history the Boston Tea Party is an early example of civil disobedience. You will recall that the thirteen colonies were under the direct rule of England. England, the accepted and established government, determined and levied the taxes. The colonists refused to pay the taxes levied on the tea, which they then dumped into the sea. This was an outright act of non-co-operation and civil disobedience with the established government. Many of the contemporaries of these men called them "agitators" and "traitors"; but to-day our history books describe them as "defenders of liberty" and "true patriots."

The colonists argued "no taxation without representation." Today Negroes and white people who love freedom say "no first-class dying for

second-class citizenship; no service without equality for all."

The Underground Railroad¹ was non-violent and it was also non-cooperation with existing law. It was vigorous resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law. This law was passed by Congress and later upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Dred Scott decision.

Nevertheless, thousands of white people, slaves and free Negroes defied the U.S. Government and the U.S. Supreme Court because they felt that freedom was the most important thing in the world. They knew that Congress and the Supreme Court were on the wrong side of the struggle for freedom, so they ignored the law and did what they felt to be right.

One of the outstanding resisters to the unjust Fugitive Slave Law was

Theodore Parker of Boston. In 1848 he said:

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"I know that men argue . . . that the constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land and that (the constitution) sanctions slavery. There is no supreme law except that made by God; if our laws contradict that, the sooner they end or the sooner they are broken the better. . . . When rulers have inverted their function and enacted wickedness into a law which treads down the inalienable rights of man . . . I tear the hateful statute . . . to shivers; I trample it underneath my feet; I do it in the name of . . . justice and of man."

One has not only a right but a profound duty to urge and counsel resistance to a law which seriously violates the principle of equality and justice upon

which real community and security depend.

When Theodore Parker refused to abide by the Fugitive Slave Law he was howled at in the Press and accused of treason on the streets. Although he knew that his act was not treason and although the Government never did try anyone connected with the Underground Railroad for treason, Parker replied:

"I think lightly of what is called treason against a government; ... treason against the people (the Fugitive Slave Law), against mankind, against God is a great sin and not lightly to be spoken of."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The reference is to the smuggling of slaves by the Abolitionists across the borders the Southern states into the North.—Ed.

Commenting on segregated draft to-day, Donald Harrington, assistant minister of New York's Community Church, said on May 16th, 1948,

'there are laws which it is man's duty to break."

A Jim Crow draft would violate the American ideals of equality and justice to such a degree that it is the duty of the people to maintain those ideals in spite of the law by refusing to register under a Jim Crow draft until racial segregation and discrimination are outlawed by congressional action or executive order. To follow this course may not be easy; there may be intimidation, mass arrest, possible physical pain, and for some, death. On the other hand, if thousands, both men and women, act together now and make it known that they will not submit to a Jim Crow draft, the government will be forced to listen. It's a gamble! But as Randolph stated, "If we must die, let us die as free men and not as Jim Crow slaves."

#### Whose Survival?

Civil aircraft are not of dominant importance to the manufacturers. The industry generally can survive quite well without them. It cannot survive without the R.A.F.

Financial Times, September 16th, 1948.

#### Home, Sweet Home!

An investigation has revealed that ten inmates of the Darmstadt internment camp failed to fill in *questionnaires* required for de-nazification proceedings. By this means the men, who are all refugees from Eastern Germany, attempted to avoid the trial which might have set them free. They are reported to have said that they were comfortable in the camp and regarded their prospects of life in the present Germany economy with misgivings.

The Times, May 31st, 1948.

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## THE LAST ISOLATIONIST

HOR those who delight in the paradoxes of human endeavour, there is some relish in the spectacle of the shade of Charles Austin Beard, political analyst and former Dean of American Historiography, obstinately loyal to his sadly battered vessel, "Isolation," and continuing to fire broadsides which have an extraordinarily damaging effect upon an enemy whom history has already pronounced the victor. Professor Beard was that rara avis of his cultural milieu, a man who had worked out his principles and vigorously carried them to an increasingly bitter end. These principles, which he entitled "Continentalism," were summed up in the view that the two continents of the western hemisphere should suffice American imperialism, and which in that case would, of course, not be imperialism. From this determined perspective, he directed veritable atombursts such as his latest and last work, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War: A Study in Appearances and Realities. This distillation of an enormous amount of material displays in a glaring light the venality, hypocrisy and sheer viciousness of the highest organs of the United States Government; and at the same time proves to be the final position toward which all his former comrades-in-arms have been tending-Beard's honesty and outworn liberal imperialism make of him only a laggard in this respect.

Cutting through the wordy curtain hung before the direct causes of the war and the initial attack on Pearl Harbour, the book indicates forces whose vectors extend into the future and whose meaning in important respects escaped the admirable Beard. Still, for significant by-products, there is nothing to compare with this opus. Despite the sacrosanct archives, foreign and domestic, Beard shows conclusively how Franklin Delano Roosevelt forced the Japanese into war and managed to "manœuvre the Japanese into the position of firing the first shot. . . ."

Bound by the election campaign pledge forced upon him by the people ("Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars," and "We will not participate in foreign wars except in case of attack") President Roosevelt used all the power of his office to create that "attack" which would permit

him to enlist the United States in the conflict for world domination. In the course of his endeavours, he deliberately violated not only his pledges but the country's laws which he had taken an oath to uphold, ordering the Navy into convoy duty and action against German ships and submarines in direct contravention of the Lend-Lease Act for which he himself was responsible. When the "incidents" this "leader" of the American people had prepared failed against the historically generated suspicions of his "followers," he was forced to turn to an arena with which the masses were less familiar—the Pacific and the Japanese.

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It is here that Professor Beard's efforts are particularly instructive. In brief forceful strokes he demonstrates the end of an era in the mysterious Orient and prepares an understanding for the next. The real outcome of the famous Atlantic Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill was not that "scrap of paper," the Atlantic Charter, but among others an agreement to force Japanese economy into a strait-jacket out of which it could only explode into war. The "sanctions" against Japan which were demanded and refused on the occasion of the invasion of Manchuria were now applied with a vengeance, and coupled with a clear ultimatum against "aggression" in the Pacific which would relieve the pressure on Japan's economy.

But in spite of all this, the "war mad" Japanese were anxious to take steps to avoid armed conflict. Prince Konoye, then Premier, offered to confer with Roosevelt, in a setting similar to the Atlantic Conference, and indicated his willingness to make substantial concessions to maintain relations short of war. Roosevelt calmly waited until Konoye's failure resulted in the replacement of his cabinet by a military dictatorship, as the American ambassador to Japan, Grew, had predicted in his correspondence with the President. It then became Roosevelt's task to conceal his knowledge of the impending holocaust in the Pacific.

Despite the Professor's best efforts to make out the commanders at Hawaii as the crucified victims of the venomous politicians headed by Roosevelt, General Short and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel emerge as grandiose fools before the event and as patriotic scapegoats after it. This is especially true of the latter who "had been jumped about fifty numbers—over other admirals—and given the assignment" after his predecessor had been removed "for refusing to keep the American fleet bottled up in Pearl Harbour." There is ample ground for the suspicion that this deliberate "bottling" was motivated by more than the fact that "numerous complaints were forwarded to high administration sources by merchants, business interests and others in the Hawaiian Islands that the fleet was being kept out of Pearl Harbour and at sea too much." If Roosevelt's personal files

and other secret documents still withheld from the public are not destroyed as was the famous "winds execute message" (an intercepted Japanese code which read "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia," three days before the attack) we may yet see the direct conscious responsibility for the Pearl Harbour murders laid, as a proper tribute, on the graves of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his War Cabinet.

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The "quick and the dead" are named and impaled with precise stipulations of their infamous roles: General George C. Marshall served the apprenticeship for his present diplomatic posture by preparing the war and maintaining the preparations secret for long years after; China's ambassador to the United States, Dr Hu Shih, contributed his mite for the "liberal" Chiang Kai-shek regime by operating efficiently to prevent a "modus vivendi" with Japan; Winston Churchill is revealed as the junior partner in the plot evolved at the Atlantic Conference to make the war truly global; Admiral Harold R. Stark showed himself to be a weak reed in the secret naval manœuvres which violated law and public sentiment : he wrote letters which subsequently helped uncover the truth and for which he was placed in the same disgrace he had prepared for Admiral Kimmel; Henry L. Stimson saw the adoption of his "doctrine" for the Far East to an extent beyond anything he had hoped when he first urged it on President Hoover; Sir Alexander Cadogan achieved part of the tutelage for his present United Nations eminence through the lessons in perfidy gained at the Atlantic Conference; Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, lacking the safeguards of his master, Roosevelt, emerges as a man caught lying by a Congressional committee, when he attempted to hide from public scrutiny his complicity in murder by diplomacy.

This emotionless glare focused on President Roosevelt's regime and machinations falls into the highly confused political scene in America where Stalinism clings to the "Roosevelt legend" and native reaction tries desperately to tear aside the veil surrounding it. Given a world perspective by one of its few competent politicians of these days, American political necessity is expressing its gratitude by stripping him of his raiment while the quisling Stalinists leap to the defence of his memory. Regardless of the intent and deceit of these contending forces, Beard's scholarly production is proof, even a weapon, against them both. It casts all these latter day Machiavellians in their proper light.

But it is in this very forest of devils that our otherwise excellent researcher lost his compass. Slaying these devils, including their leader Roosevelt, for some five hundred pages, our valiant historian admits somewhat wearily

at the end: "these agencies in turn subsidise professors and 'students of international relations' by the hundreds." It is therefore not surprising that those directly lampooned by the professorial pen delegate the task of replying to a President of Brooklyn College, Harry D. Gideonse, who departs from the usual treatment of death by silence to mumble: "Dr. Beard is primarily a political pamphleteer without concern for the evaluation or sifting of evidence, for historical perspective or context."

It is this cursed quest for devils which in the end permits the devils to escape without permanent damage. Only fleetingly does the moving finger of Dr. Beard touch on that which nourishes and determines the activity of governmental murderers. To do more would have imperilled the assumptions on which he had based much of his life and work. In truth, the embattled professor had no choice, for to have gone further would have forced him to admit the charge in the hack's reply, no "historical perspective." Incautiously, like most men who have written much, the Dean of American History has committed himself in an earlier work: "Slowly, but with increasing force, it was realised that the 'foreign outlet' doctrines of imperialism and internationalism were illusions." Limiting all previous analysis to his hemisphere, Beard inquired "What (is) left of . . . the imperialist promise of an escape from domestic calamity into an everwidening prosperity. . . . ?"

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It is now too late to tell the Dean what is obvious to every intelligent child—despite the "subsidised" professors. The American domination of the world which is replacing that of England is no "illusion" and it has provided an escape from domestic calamity. Of course, the necessary question is "How and for whom?" That part of the answer which Beard could not acknowledge was the cry of Clair Wilcox, acting chairman of the United States delegation to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Unemployment at Havana: "They (other countries) may be told they cannot sell to us until they modify policies we do not like. They may discover when they attempt to sell in other markets, that we have been there first to freeze them out." To probe this in its ramifications would bring to the surface the fact that the imperialism of the Monroe Doctrine which was Beard's acceptable limit has been successfully extended to the whole world.

As though in anticipation Beard has written:

"The first of these doctrines is the jubilant American cry that the United States is now a world power and must assume the obligations of a world power. Undoubtedly the United States is a great power in the world and has obligations as such. But the range of its effective power support-

able by armed forces and economic resources is limited. The further away from its base on the American continent the government of the United States seeks to exert power over the affairs and relations of other countries the weaker its efficiency becomes; and the further it oversteps the limits of its strength the more likely it is to lead this nation into disaster . . . a terrible defeat in a war in Europe or Asia beyond the conquering power of its soldiers, sailors and airmen. If wrecks of over-extended empires scattered through the centuries offer any instruction in the present, it is that a quest for absolute power not only corrupts but in time destroys. A prudent recognition and calculation of the limits on power is a mandate for statesmen and nations that seek to survive in the struggles of 'power politics.'"

And here at last is what caused the good professor sleepless nights—the "over-extended empire" which is destroyed "in time." It is necessary merely to be "prudent" and Pax Americana will last "through the centuries."

And in a sense the historian is right. America's accession to the throne of power comes when the entire social order is capable only of increasing wretchedness against which the throne is but a temporary shelter. If Dr. Beard could have raised his head just a little above the limitations of his sphere of study and special interest he would have discovered that the worldwide destruction has its reflection and driving force in his own country. He might have noted the significance of some work by another American professor, Sumner Slichter, who points out that increasing production is being achieved on the basis of decreasing productivity. It is a crumbling throne to which America is heir, and one which crumbles from within, not simply from "over-extension," "In time," it is true, many things may come about, even the resurgence of the British Empire through the domination of western Europe and by its reduction, together with the rest of the world, to an even more horrible level of existence than can yet be perceived. However, such possibilities would have disappointed Professor Beard, nor would being "prudent" safeguard the future on the present basis. Welcome or no, it is this truth which more or less clearly guided Roosevelt. For "Prudence" meant in fact the gradual elimination of the United States from the determining spheres of world politics with the consequent decline of all values and/or turning society over to the millions who had been systematically deceived throughout American history. It would be gratifying to be able to say that the latter was what being "prudent' meant for Beard.

Here is posed essentially, like most political and personal decisions, a choice of alternatives: To trace the villainy of President Roosevelt through

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s of a world the various "interests" to the bedrock of social relations and bend one's efforts to change these relations or else to accept the premises against whose conclusions Beard could rail but futilely. This is the fork in the road at which the Dean of American history had arrived. The final paradox is to be seen in the long step he had taken toward his enemies in the very last book in which he attacks them.

#### Civilisation's Coming of Dotage-I

We must start work now to reform the grandfathers and grandmothers if we are to save the people of the world from self-destruction.

This was the advice given to-day by Dr. Margaret Mead, an American anthropologist, addressing the International Conference on Mental Health at Central Hall, Westminster.

She said we could get a better world in, say, 1,000 years if we adopted better methods of training the children, but with the world in its present state we could not afford to wait.

Evening Standard, August 17th, 1948.

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#### Civilisation's Coming of Dotage-II

Dr. Julian S. Huxley, Director-General of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation, welcomed to-day formation of the World Federation for Mental Health and suggested as one of its tasks the study of Yoga and other Asiatic and Eastern disciplines.

... Later he told reporters: "I think each (Western civilisation and the Eastern disciplines) should try to understand the other. Many groups of the East are trained to do many things. So far they have never been investigated. How is it possible, for example, for a man to control his breathing like some of them do or get himself in a state of mystical exaltation? If we could find out how, there might be some way to turn these practices into a beneficial force for Western civilisation."

N.Y. Herald Tribune (Paris edn.), August 22nd, 1948.

#### Civilisation's Coming of Dotage-III

Dr. George Brock Chisolm, Director-General of the World Health Organisation, . . . emphasised that the federation must "implement its own recommendations" and must embark on its work in a positive, bold manner. "The main danger," he said, "is that you might do all this apologetically."

N.Y. Herald Tribune, August 22nd, 1948.

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# JOHN DEWEY AND THE PECULIAR TRAITS OF AMERICAN THOUGHT

PART II: PRAGMATISM'S EVOLUTIONARY MODEL

ALL varieties of American thought have one common denominator, their "individualism." The country's political tradition, the philosophy of its revolution, stems from the empiricism of Locke, with its older, more literal and practical notion of the office of individual experience. This sufficed for all the needs of active thought when the phase of the life which dominated was the dispersal and repulsion one from another of the country's constituent European molecules spreading into the unsettled wilderness. But when practical life took on new dimensions, the rapid industrialisation after the Civil War creating a demand for science and technology, these in turn made possible a new expression in the philosophic sphere. A small discussion club was formed in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the 1870s, among whose members were Oliver Wendell Holmes, William James, Chauncey Wright (a friend and correspondent of Darwin's), and Charles Sanders Peirce. This club will probably retain a precarious place in history by reason of the origin in its discussions of Peirce's essay, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, from which pragmatism is dated:

"That much admired 'ornament of Logic'—the doctrine of clearness and distinctness—may be pretty enough, but it is high time to relegate to our cabinet the antique bijou, and to wear about us something better

adapted to modern uses.

"The very first lesson that we have a right to demand that logic shall teach us is how to make our ideas clear; and a most important one it is, depreciated only by minds that stand in need of it. . . . It is most easily learned by those whose ideas are meagre and restricted; and far happier they than such as wallow helplessly in a rich mud of conceptions. A nation, it is true, may in the course of generations overcome the disadvantage of an excessive wealth of language and its natural concomitant, a vast unfathomable deep of ideas. . . . It is terrible to see how a single unclear idea, a single formula without meaning, lurking in a young man's head, will sometimes act like an obstruction of inert matter in an artery, hindering the nutrition of the brain, and condemning its victim to pine away in the fullness of his intellectual vigour and in the midst of intellectual plenty. Many a man has cherished for years as his hobby some vague shadow of an idea, too meaningless to be positively false; he has, nevertheless, passionately loved it, has made it his companion by day and by night, and has given to it his strength and his life . . . and then he has waked up some bright morning to find it gone, clean vanished away like the beautiful Melusina of the fable, and the essence of his life gone with it. I have myself known such a man; and who can tell how many histories of circlesquarers, metaphysicians, astrologers and what not may be told in the old German (French !) story."1

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from *The Development of American Philosophy*, ed. Muelder & Sears, Houghton Mifflin, Cambridge 1940 p. 343.

Through this is refracted the social and cultural condition of American life. Though the same strain is visible here, it would be an error to equate this entirely with contemporary European positivism. The latter likewise set out from ideas which were "meagre and restricted," but its heritage of empiricism came more from Hume than from Locke. Hume, it is said, was prone to forget the scepticism embodied in his philosophy when he was drinking and playing backgammon with his friends. This clearly betrays the dualism, the division of thought, which the positivists inherit from him. The professorial life in a European city makes on the one hand its demands for "scientific" empirical hard-headedness, for ideas that shall be meagre and restricted; but on the other it offers to our positivist a very different phase of existence, a society and culture possessing its own vitality and substance, exercising an unquestionable command in its own realm. But in America it is otherwise. America lacks a compact society and therewith an inwardly living history. Its culture, the product and distillation of such a history, is imported from Europe, and for the American who sets himself the task of making authentically his own that which he calls knowledge this culture really is an "excessive wealth of language" and "vast, unfathomable deep of ideas." As the European at the end of the Middle Ages confronted a mass of custom and thought which descended to him from a period remote in time and which by its remoteness from the reasons and conditions of its origin had become mere superstition, so the American has before him a body of culture which by its removal in space from the continent of its origin has become in truth "the vague shadow of an idea." What European history since Descartes had ravelled, is again unravelled in the journey to America, and Peirce, facing provincial backwardness, the cultural affectations of liberal theology, uncertain imitations of European models, appropriately starts with the Cartesian work. It is for this reason that pragmatism is not, like its positivist cousin, intrinsically the function of a part of the existing cultural total, but like the thought of the European Renaissance tends to take on its shoulders the burden of philosophic reconstruction of the whole culture.

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Philosophy in Europe had gone far beyond Hume, but only as it lived in a world which was undergoing a historical experience of great dimensions: Hegel consciously constructed his system to an historical model. historical experience has since disappeared almost entirely from the forefront of general consciousness, and, with the huge development of industry and science, thought is once more thrown back to Hume. The history never penetrated to America at all, and the revival of empiricism starts farther back, from Locke. Locke's empirical thinker was first of all the English merchant (as yet far from the great bourgeois), bound together as an economic molecule with his fellows by the relations of trade. If the economic process in England operated to compact the molecules together, in America it operated to dissever them, as the molecules of a gas which is released in a vacuum separate and fly apart in mutual repulsion. It is familiar that America in its years of national formation lived two lives: that of the frontier, where was found the flux of the molecules, and that of the eastern seaboard (first of all), where they commenced to collect and solidify into towns and cities such as they had left behind in Europe. But even when they form such communities, their life continues to be dominated by the existence of the frontier. Social relations take up into themselves the character of negativity, of mutual alienation of the molecules, which was first not the social but the palpably physical fact of spatial separation among the men who undertook to settle in the wilderness. It is the carrying over into men's relations with one another of the cast of mind which Lincoln's father expressed when he judged that if a neighbour was close enough in the forest for him to see the smoke from his cabin, it was time to move on. Such social relations carry down to the present, and perpetuate the existence of this human molecule, who is the well-known American "individual." The philosophic reflection, indeed, goes back even beyond Locke. The depth of men's alienation from their fellows may be gauged in Peirce's revival of the notion of cosmic chance ("tychism"), which had not been meaningful in European life since the

times of Epicurus and the Stoics.

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In the first section of this treatment we have sought to trace the historical continuity of the development of human culture with that of animal forms. And clear parallels appear between these two levels when we consider that in this was the growth of civilisation in America. The spread of forms is called in natural history "radiation." It has two dimensions, the geographic and the adaptive, which appear in correlation. The former is the spread of forms outward, horizontally, over the earth's surface, the other the (vertical) spread into qualitatively new realms of the environment. The former mode of motion is the earlier and more primitive: at any given level adaptive radiation comes most into prominence when mobile forms have spread outward in the environment until confined within spatial boundaries which force them back on one another. The basic pattern of geographic radiation is Holarctic. Qualitatively new animal and cultural forms originate at centres around the polar area, by reason that the backwash of the tides of radiation is here the deepest, most intense and variegated. Civilisation follows the same pattern modified by the fact that the adaptive component of human radiation far outstrips the geographic. Technique and culture develop faster than the mobility of civilisation as such, which can only spread as far as it can bring along its extensive alterations of the earth's surface.

The distinction between these two dimensions of radiation gives us the key for the understanding of America. Human society is not only an association of animals (it is this at the broadest level and primarily), but also of cultural forms. These forms, which we speak of as technique, art, science, philosophy, the products of development in the adaptive dimension, exist at the top of a pyramid of older forms, shading down to the animal level. Cultural motion or process, in which the new forms arise, exists on the base of older forms of motion. In the modern epoch in Europe in which new political, social, philosophic forms were forged, broad layers of the people were drawn into this labour, and they debated and voted in tumultuous assembly with all available powers. This stirring also produced the migration to America, and from among those who occupied not the least prominent part in this flux. But by and large those who came to America were those who voted with their feet. It is the older, more basic form of criticism of existing institutions, of social process, and occurs on the spatial not the adaptive plane. In culture also there is something comparable. In industry and technique advanced practice is carried to America and can there expand

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In the first section we have cited W. D. Matthew's Climate and Evolution for a treatment of the geographic dimension; for a very clear account of the adaptive dimension see H. F. Osborn's *The Origin and Evolution of Life*, N.Y., Charles Scribners, 1921.

and multiply. This is, however, qualified by the following circumstance: that the forms of such practice require to be mobile and self-contained. Those ideas and forms, even if later they prove to be important, which are not perfectly elaborated and cast into familiar and usable shape, which still to a great extent refer back into and depend upon their European matrix

of development, are not readily transmitted.

Thus the older, more self-contained and practical empiricism of Locke becomes the starting point of pragmatism, and not that of Hume, which assumed and depended on an environment of culture alongside it. And for the same reasons German idealism, particularly that of Hegel, which never quite separated itself from its matrix (that is, never clearly recognised that what it sought to describe was the real historical world, reducible to a precise and objective statement which could be accepted and handled by all, and not a mythical World-Historic Spirit turning out in the end to be a national bird which comes to roost in Prussia), remained totally unassimilable for They did not and could not have before their eyes the historical model to which it was drawn, and Hegelianism comes into America at best as what Dewey calls "institutional idealism," a perception that social forms have an organic character, which is none the less completely lacking in the sense of the historic movement which gives them this character. It is with these considerations in view that we must likewise assay the importance of natural science for pragmatism. For it is just natural science which is most self-contained, which most carries in itself all necessary elements of method and test, and is thus not merely implicitly but practically universally valid and usable. It is the part of culture most genuinely assimilable in America. The sceptical insistence on sticking close to the truths of science and avoiding the "vast unfathomable deep of ideas" of other realms of culture, has another meaning for pragmatism than for European positivism, and rings far truer in American conditions. Pragmatism is on the one hand thrown back to Locke, to the self-contained experience of the individual human molecule; but on the other hand it finds available for the purpose of reconstructing philosophically this experience — the molecular experience which is American life—the most advanced science of its time. In this is manifested the duality which, on the one side, appears as a weakness, but, on the other, exhibits the work of what is called in history a combined development—a duality visible throughout its evolution.

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If for whatever reason (if some books should fall into his hands, for example) a man living in the American milieu is led to make a philosophical attempt, he discovers that in the existing society there is only accident, cultural retardation, Puritan theology diluted to fill out the range of cultural offices — what George Santayana well dubs the "genteel tradition." There is no life, no inner organic process, to serve as a model for understanding the process of thought that arose out of the organic evolution which is history. Such life exists only at the frontier and in organic nature. Moreover, such reflective thought has this in common with the life of the frontiersman: it is on its own, it must depend on itself in a waste area of superstition, just

as the frontiersman must be self-dependent in the wilderness.

The actual frontier is in the nature of things replaced by civilisation. Its society is ephemeral, it cannot be laid hold of in the manner of a Proust, who, in an old stable society existing within its accumulated history lying about it everywhere layer upon layer — himself immobile — traces the life in

and by this maze. A certain self-sustaining mobility of mind is required to catch the quality of the changing life in its migration across the uniform. empty prairie. Where do we find it better than in Mark Twain? Yet the superb forth-flowing vigour — like that of a suspended humming bird — of a Life on the Mississippi is, as the frontier is visibly engulfed in capitalist piracy and sordid, empty politics, scaled down to the sceptical bitterness of The Man Who Corrupted Hadleyburg. American culture gained little from the fact that the most advanced and active individuals left New England for the west. The culture of the cities, the "genteel tradition," along with the cities themselves, wholly vanquishes the frontier. The preachers and old women had remained in the east to establish that "genteel tradition," and the preachers and old women prevailed. This least leavened of national cultures destroyed the frontier as it reduces everything to commodity relations, without consciousness and with a natural, prepotent, ineffable gracelessness. It destroyed it from within, because the frontier was no true society, but an accidental collection of swift-moving human molecules, each with the seed of destruction — individual ambition — inside himself.

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y lying life in The physical separation among men had implied an economic independence; and the great wealth of the continent as yet unexhausted, even if it require co-operative exploitation, allows the flickering candle—the fantasy of "unlimited individual opportunity"—to be interminably re-lit. Thus the cellular or molecular "experience" of the individual in American life remains penned within itself. Pragmatism, the philosophic reconstruction of this experience, cannot, like European philosophy, find its model in society: it finds it in the organic world presented by Darwinian biology, which begins to invade the universities after the Civil War. The importance of Darwinism for American thought cannot be over-estimated. Pragmatism reconstructs the immediate subject matter of philosophy, thought, in terms of the evolution of the biological organism, the unit corresponding to the model by which pragmatism represents the evolution of thought. John Dewey speaks of it explicitly as the "biological-anthropological model."

Pragmatism shows its characteristic failing, the limit of indigenous American thought in general, in the fact that just as it cannot penetrate social, historical process to reveal its evolution, it has never considered its biological model from the historical side. But biology also has a history, which is a world history; and indeed the American palæontologist W. D. Matthew has given our knowledge of the geographic distribution of organic forms in geologic time its farthest development beyond the basic statement in Ch. XII in The Origin of Species. Consequently our endeavour in the first section of this treatment is to develop the biological premises of pragmatism at the historical level, to the point of expressing the history of thought itself - the European thought which is the heritage of America in terms of its natural history. It is only in this way that we may provide a thorough groundwork for criticising pragmatism's conception of evolution in its own terms. American thought itself has a natural history, and in this present section we are concerned to trace pragmatism's development as it reflects the limits of that history. The most important part of its development is that of its evolutionary model. The "biological-anthropological model "expresses its limitation, the fact that it does not get beyond molecular "experience"; none the less this model grows, and shows a tendency to transform itself into the true — historical — model. To complete the transformation in order to examine its stages is our entire purpose. The scope of the material which must be dealt with is such that we cannot within the confines of this treatment attempt to deal in detail with the whole of it. We deal with each figure, then, only in reference to his contribution to the development of the model — which is the main, the most important thing.

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It is for this reason that we largely skip over Charles Peirce (entirely without underestimating his importance), since despite all his anticipations of the ideas developed by the others he does not speak in predominantly biological terms. This we first find in William James, whose Principles of Psychology1 brings within individual "experience" the advances in knowledge of the organism which biology and physiological psychology had made since the times of Locke and Hume. Out of these advances stems pragmatism's break with the Kantian tradition which had built on Hume, and its two main epistemological theses: first, the denial that experience is given in the form of discretely presented elements of sensation; and second, the denial that the organisation of experience requires Kantian a priori principles from without. The material of experience as it is first given to the human organism is not discrete elements, but the macroscopic confusion which confronts the child. The means by which it is reduced to order is the operation of habit. Hume declares that experience must be "entirely silent" about the way in which objects cause our mental images of them. But if experience is understood biologically, it speaks in the language of habit. In this way we may construct knowledge without ever, like Kant, departing from the realm of experience itself.

Mark Twain writes about himself, "I am the sort of person that does things. . . . I have been punished many a time, and bitterly, for doing things and reflecting afterward, but these tortures have been of no value to me: I still do the thing commanded by Circumstance and Temperament and reflect afterward." The action is a necessity for the temperament, which the life itself imposes. Twain's swift-flying, self-moving humour originates as an escape — by any means whatever, by an explosion if necessary — from environing constraints: the ugly Puritan pall, niggardliness, jaundiced eye of suspicion and sensitivity to "sin" which was the life of his upbringing. With a self-initiated motion he leaves all that behind, and brings the world into his direct grasp - knowledge mediated by his own activity. That is an excellent example of the action and the need to which pragmatism's "experience" gives philosophic form. It expresses both the strength and the weakness, which are curiously closely conjoined. The gain of the frontiersman was his independence and his contact with Nature — a gain none the less directly qualified by the deprivation of the society of his fellows. A sort of mobility is achieved, which is at the same time the limitation evident in the need to carry one's provender on one's own back. It is that sort of mobility and self-dependence in the realm of thought which James' famous

description pictures:

"When we take a general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness, what strikes us first is the different pace of its parts. Like a bird's life, it seems to be an alternation of flights and perchings. The rhythm of language expresses this, where every thought is expressed in a sentence,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> N.Y., Henry Holt, 1890.

and every sentence closed by a period. The resting places are usually occupied by sensorial images of some sort . . . the places of flight are filled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic. . . ."<sup>1</sup>

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James' own manner as a teacher was full of extravagant or droll flights of the imagination, a certain unseriousness and humility - which are not in the least a teacher's affectation, but a mode of thought, which corresponds to the demands of the life. The self-dependence is expressed in the acute introspective sensitivity visible in this passage. Experience, when it is thrown back on itself, gains in intensity in its immediate visceral, felt, qualities. Thought has the task of moving to its objective in a society which does not sustain it, on which it cannot lean. It must leap the greatest gaps without a reliance on either critics or collaborators: the means in that exuberance and unseriousness to which Mark Twain's humour gave so fine a form. comparison comes to mind there which is not so extravagant as it might first appear: the place of North America in natural history. The uniform, broad plains in the interior of the continent and the seasonal extremes encountered there by reason of the mountain ranges running from North to South had favoured the development of swift-running animals capable of migrating long distances across that open prairie. There is so little new under the sun, the lines of historic continuity which connect organic evolution with cultural are so pronounced, that something comparable, responding with like adaptation to the same causes, here appears in American thought as a cultural product. Indeed, men in settling America had adapted to the same conditions which affected the animals. The fact that the middle of North America is a uniform, open plain conditions the manner in which it was settled. Its heart is occupied by only one great country in which waves of European settlers could flood out unimpeded - unlike South America with its regional separations. This lack of boundaries, this uniformity, a geographic fact, is reflected culturally in the flux and alienation of human molecules (the very mobility acting to repel one from another and impoverish their common life). The result, the absence of a cultural matrix, is the state of affairs for which indigenous thought must compensate.

These considerations make clear that pragmatism is the authentic form which indigenous thought takes on, bringing to a sharp expression both intrinsic merit and intrinsic limit. The two sides of this innate duality correspond to the two distinct environments: on the one side, that of those human activities which because of their firm establishment in culture or their self-comained character really can be assimilated by the molecular active mind; and on the other, that of the balance of activities, in which reign, by reason of the weakness and negativity of social relations, "vague shadows of ideas," mere imitations of European culture. But any tendency in culture, in order to achieve integrity, must actively assimilate its material. Thus as indigenous thought arises, it seeks to extend the realm in which it is at home (that of the self-contained act), into other areas of human concern. The positive side of the duality visible throughout its growth, the success it gains in this endeavour, is its merit: the fact that it does not complete it, its weakness. The narrowness of its channel of growth is decided by the fact that its main stimulus comes from the new things arising in science, and not from any deep current in society which flows far beyond the university

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> P. 160 " briefer course" in psychology.

and the engineer's desk. When nothing that broader layers of men are also seeking corresponds to the goal of reflection, it is difficult to achieve the conceit of history. The reflection of indigenous American thought is a solitary activity; if it reaches any objective, it approaches it as a scout rather than as the head of an army. Its appropriate mode of motion is humour, or unweighted imaginative flights, which willingly sacrifice that sense of moving in company with a multitude of others in order to achieve mobility. For the individual who reflects there is gained in this way a certain valuable humility and candour towards one's own efforts. But these traits carry with them likewise an inevitable obtuseness: the incapacity to judge by an objective standard the importance of one's own work. The original naïve humility of such indigenous production, which is conditioned by the disinterested attitude society assumes towards the given endeavours, can turn into, e.g. an equally naïve sense of importance if figure or tendency for whatever reason achieve recognition. This weakness is a weakness before the official culture (the "genteel tradition"): and if figure or tendency succumb to it the negative traits of this tradition, which express the backwardness of the broad social environment, make their way into the production. We see this in the unevenness of Mark Twain, who could, for example, write the spontaneous books which make him famous, but at the same time could take

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seriously the accepted (bad) novelistic stereotype of his time.

These considerations are necessary to explain the philosophic reputation and production of William James. We see in him the same unevenness; it is correctly said that there are several William James's. It is pragmatism's misfortune that it is associated in the European mind (and that of many Americans) with his popular lectures bearing its name. But we get a vivid insight into the character of American life as a milieu for cultural productions in learning that James, with his unseriousness of manner, was held in slight regard at Harvard until his reputation for the "Psychology" began to filter back from Europe. His students and colleagues, it seems, preferred the solemn, preacherish kind. And this tells not James' story alone. The brilliant Charles Peirce, pragmatism's precursor-founder, and beyond this a mathematician of the first abilities, was never so much as able to get a regular teaching position in America. George Santayana, one of the very few teachers in this field who among his contemporaries deserves to be remembered, remained for long years at Harvard without even the modest degree of recognition borne by a full professorship. This negativity of the milieu is found also in other fields (as a Willard Gibbs may testify), but in this one at its acutest. It has not been overcome down to the present - as we shall see in the case of the extraordinary G. H. Mead. When James commenced to feel the response of his contemporaries that side of him which is expressed in The Will to Believe, the Pragmatism and the Varieties of Religious Experience came into prominence. But this side expresses most of all not what is peculiar to pragmatism — its biological analysis of a self-contained experience which has been driven back on itself — but the backwardness of the broader intellectual environment in America. Pragmatism's scheme of experience, if we view it somewhat abstractly, is: ideas are to be taken as hypotheses, whose test is in their functioning. As a scheme, this notion is not confined to pragmatism. But the crucial question is this: what part of the total of human activity lies within and gets its form from this process in experience, and what is brought into it from without, as "will," "purpose,"

"inspiration"—making the operation with the hypotheses one of "convenient fictions" which we "choose," etc. James' belief in the priority of the "will" for this process in experience marks simply a weakness before the existing official culture, which does determine our wills and purposes in so far as we cannot consciously reform them. The more this aspect of James' thought prevails, the further it departs from that which makes pragmatism what it is, and takes on the appearance of contemporary European voluntarism and dualism. The negative side of the American environment, conditioning his naïveté, here dominates. His acute feeling for the views of others which the pragmatists as a whole show leads to his identifying his ideas with those of the anti-intellectualist Bergson, and the dilution of the special character of pragmatism is complete.

Just what does make pragmatism what it is, however, is the specific way in which it reconstructs the self-contained experience on which the American environment, furnishing the individual with all the scientific and cultural instruments that have been shaken out and made generally usable in their European matrix, nevertheless throws him back. These instruments, experimental science notably, are the products of a vastly more advanced cultural development than the prevailing notions in education, ethics, art, politics. This universal feebleness and backwardness in the wider social life imposes its pall upon the educated man in the American universities; it presents to him, like medieval superstition in early modern Europe, some-

thing which must be overcome in every sphere.

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That is the need which gives rise to the pragmatism of the "Chicago school," whose best known representative is John Dewey. It is the decisive form of pragmatism, and of indigenous American thought at large, for it seeks to interpret or reconstruct the whole of experience in terms of that inner environment which thought can really inhabit and be at home to itself. The biological model is enlarged to apply not only to the narrower cognitive aspect of human activity, but to the whole of it, the "will" as well. Dewey has elaborated the basic scheme of experience, the theory of knowledge, and has likewise extended it most widely into several spheres of culture; this confers on him the critical role in the school. If the European Enlightenment admitted nothing to knowledge which did not present itself clearly before the subject faculties (in a passive role), this pragmatic enlightenment admits nothing which cannot be derived out of the individual act. The precondition of the Enlightenment is the growing up in the practice, the everyday life, and its accompanying knowledge of things, of that which is always more at odds with existing tradition in wider spheres. That tradition comes to appear something alien and negative to this common life which every individual has under his eye and hand. The power of the Enlightenment, which rapidly changed the whole scene under its ray, lay in the fact that broad layers of men were prepared by this life to accept its conclusions. In every realm, it was hardly necessary to say more than — "Judge this matter by the criteria of common life (reason and experience) for which we here supply you with some general rules applicable everywhere" for its energies to be released. Custom and superstition had imposed everywhere its so-tosay palpable and obvious backwardness and worthlessness; and the alternative which every man's judgment formed almost of itself, the simple general opposite, had merely to be codified to become a force as an idea. The pragmatic "functionalism" is an idea somewhat of this sort; and it has been in this role chiefly that Dewey's philosophy has become a force in America. All of us growing in the desolation of the American universities owe to this belated Enlightenment, with its proposal that everything should be taken up organically into the active process of experience, a certain debt of gratitude. But in America the practical life in question is not so much that of a wide or compact social layer as that of a limited section of the population whose education has made the extravagant contradiction between their training in science, etc., and the general backwardness intolerable. Further, this layer has no sense of history and no organic social character of its own. Like the human molecules who settled the country previously. its primary instinct is to cut itself free of the bonds which such a web of conditions imposes. However, Enlightenment feels that it derives its strength from the fact that its essential principles sleep everywhere in human nature; and it adapts itself to this human nature as it exists in order to find and awake these principles common to the diverse actual life. Such an adaptation in American conditions must stretch even farther. The trait of mind which sets itself this task we observe already in William James as an exceptional capacity to feel oneself into, to occupy, the perspective of others. It is one of the most positive traits of pragmatism, and expresses the same thing in the intellectual realm as the hospitality and concern with the stranger of the frontier life, conditioned on the fact that strangers, bearing news, it may be, from the settlements, are few and far between. It is the compensation, the impulse which reaches back out of molecular isolation, attempting to reestablish connection with society; and, as we shall see, it is the means whereby pragmatism finally reaches out of itself. In Dewey that trait is expressed as a wide and catholic interest in a diversity of fields of the active cultural life of his contemporaries. In his extensive writings, the following two sides appear: the main motif of the pragmatic Enlightenment, the biological interpretation of experience as active, and, on the other side, the adaptation to the given sphere. If we examine this production, the natural limits of pragmatism appear. The part of Dewey's work which remains of contemporary interest includes a text of ethics, i an "introduction to the philosophy of education",2 which field was Dewey's dominating interest in the first part of his career and made his name widely known, a popular introduction to sociology, several books setting forth a special interpretation of the history of thought, 4 writings on pragmatic liberalism, 5 a treatment of æsthetics. This is on the side of the catholic interests, the extension of the motif, the circumference of the circle. Its centre, the motif itself, first stated in the protocol of the Chicago school, the 1903 Studies in Logical Theory, is developed throughout the author's career, its two most important expressions being Experience and Nature and the 1938 Logic. will confine ourselves within the limits of this treatment, to that centre which coincides with the examination of pragmatism's evolutionary model. For the circumference, beside the fact that some of the books have the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Ethics, by Dewey and Tufts, Henry Holt, N.Y., 1908.
<sup>2</sup> Democracy and Education, N.Y., MacMillan, 1916.
<sup>3</sup> Human Nature and Conduct, Henry Holt, 1922.
<sup>4</sup> In particular The Quest for Certainty, N.Y., Minton Balch, 1929.
<sup>5</sup> Individualism Old and New, N.Y., Minton Balch, 1939, Liberalism and Social Action, N.Y., Putnam, 1938, Freedom and Culture, ibid., 1938.

<sup>6</sup> Art as Experience, N.Y., Minton Balch, 1934.

<sup>7</sup> Chicago, Open Court, 1925, and N.Y., Henry Holt, 1938, respectively.

character of popularisations, it is true in a similar sense as for the old Enlightenment that one sees chiefly the central idea in the garb of the special field. This implies further that a great deal of it is hardly readable now; the backwardness of the broader environment finds this mode of reflection in Dewey's writings, which by their very readiness to do battle with views and doctrines now visibly provincial and outdated lose their interest together with these views. A book like the Ethics, for example, could not have been written in Europe, and could not be written in America now; it reflects the prevalence of religious education of the time in the very topic and drops into remoteness as America becomes Europeanised. That duality of the American mind which we have mentioned receives a classic expression in this contrast between the centre and circumference throughout Dewey's production. The inner side, it is the critical point, never entirely prevailed. That is the natural limit of pragmatism—a combined development in culture which was never completed, never really came to birth; the attempt

is orphaned by the continued dominance of Europe.

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But the positive character of the main insight expressed in the biological analogy for knowledge is incontestable. In Europe, since the end of the era of national formation in the advanced countries in the middle of the nineteenth century, which found its last great intellectual expression in the German neo-Hegelians, philosophy seemed bound by a sort of fatality, and could produce nothing but always more distorted caricatures of Hume, Rousseau and Kant. Among the European nations England was formed as a modern State the earliest, and inward historic process finding important intellectual expression had been extinct the longest. America shared with England a large part of its tradition, together with language, but this tradition, stemming from early modern times, is further blurred and dismembered in the journey to America. We have seen that it appears there as something alien, backward, negative in every sphere. Over against it stand the great achievements of research science, particularly of Darwinism, which by reason of the universality of science can be transmitted comparatively intact. The scientist as specialist does not command a very broad view in modern society; yet he gets a hold on certain powerful instrumentalities which have potential application in a wider domain. When this conjunction of factors is appreciated it becomes understandable that just in America, at the wider cultural level the most backward of modern nations, a certain philosophic re-growth stemming from science can take place. English "realism," stimulated by pragmatism (Whitehead and Bertrand Russell both felt the influence of Peirce and James), has undergone a certain parallel development, but not so pronounced.

In the protocol of the Chicago school, the 1903 Studies in Logical Theory, Dewey writes: "The entire significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social history is that every distinct organ, structure or formation, is to be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation. . ." These words will serve as key to the whole epistemological position which is developed. A concise expression of this view is found in the essay The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy." Dewey declares that modern biology necessitates the abandonment of the whole traditional theory of knowledge, whose premises are shared by

empiricists and their opponents alike.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Reprinted in large part in Muelder & Sears, 376 et seq.

"The theological problem of attaining knowledge of God as ultimate reality was transformed in effect into the philosophical problem of the possibility of attaining knowledge of reality. . . . The problem of knowledge as conceived in the industry of epistemology is the problem of knowledge in general. . . . What does this 'in general' mean? In ordinary life there are problems aplenty of knowledge in particular. . . . But there is no problem of knowledge in general. I do not mean, of course, that general statements cannot be made about knowledge, or that the problem of attaining these statements is not a genuine one . . . specific instances of success and failure in inquiry exist, and are of such character that one can discover the conditions conducing to success and failure. Statement of these conditions constitutes logic. . . . But this logical problem is at the opposite pole from the epistemological. . . . The problem of knowledge überhaupt exists because it is assumed there is a knower in general, who is outside the world to be known and who is defined in terms antithetical to the traits of the world. With analogous assumptions we could invent and discuss a problem of digestion in general. . . . But because the stomach and food inhabit a continuous stretch of existence . . . the problems of digestion are specific and plural. . . . Can one deny that if we were to take our clue from the present empirical situation, including the scientific notion of evolution (biological continuity), and the existing arts of control of nature, subject and object would be treated as occupying the same natural world as unhesitatingly as we assume the natural conjunction of an animal and its food? Would it not follow that knowledge is one way in which natural energies co-operate?"1

We thus have a theory of knowledge which recognises that knowledge exists as part of nature, and evolves as do biological organisms. Dewey calls it naturalism, and it might appear to imply materialism. It certainly makes cogent criticism of the "epistemological industry" (which supports the provincial professordom), which perpetually thrashes over the old straw of the nature or possibility of our knowledge of the external world. But the scheme is here applied to particular problems of knowledge. If we seek more

" general statements" we find the following:

"The reality is the growth process itself: childhood and adulthood are phases of a continuity, in which just because it is a history the later cannot exist until the earlier exists ('mechanistic materialism' in germ) and in which the later makes use of the registered and cumulative outcome of the earlier, or, more strictly, is its utilisation ('spiritualistic teleology' in germ). The real existence is the history in its entirety, the history just as what it is. . . . Substitute for such a growth a more extensive history of nature and call it the evolution of mind from matter, and the conclusion is not different."<sup>2</sup>

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Unlike Hegel, who declares that the man is the truth of the child, Dewey asserts that the real existence is "the history as just what it is." This description may seem strange and platitudinous; but its source should be understood. Dewey speaks commonly not of "history," but of "histories," particular and plural, just as with the problem of knowledge. And pragmatism takes a position of ontological pluralism. There are not only plural "histories," but if we take the process of history, of growth, and distinguish it into phases, no one part has a different status in reality from another; there

<sup>1</sup> 380-381, ibid. <sup>2</sup> 275-6, Experience and Nature. is simply a connection between equally real plural things. That connection is "continuity," which Dewey calls the "scientific notion of evolution." We shall have further occasion to deal with it; it expresses sufficiently well the connection which exists in the evolutionary order in the "emergent" conception of evolution, a conception which pragmatism employs but which has been also widely used elsewhere. Dewey elsewhere describes it expressively by calling it "overlapping" of the components of reality, which components are simply—there is no other possible expression for it—different but connected.

"The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory of logic is continuity of the lower (less complex) and the higher (more complex) activities and forms. The idea of continuity is not self-explanatory. But its meaning excludes complete rupture on one side and mere repetition of identities on the other; it precludes reduction of the 'higher' to the 'lower' just as it precludes complete breaks and gaps. The growth and development of any living organism from seed to maturity illustrates the meaning of continuity."

The deep-going ambiguity in this will further appear; it says in effect, in answer to the classic question "mind or matter?", "Mind and Matter," which are the equally real parts of a "history" which is itself the reality. It is obvious from the example above (and further suggests itself, for example, in Dewey's preoccupation with education), where the model for such a description of "history" is taken. The biological model for evolution is here in Haeckel's term, an ontogenetic model, the pattern as it is reflected into the development of the individual form, not the original which is found in phylogeny, the development of the stock. In ontogeny, the process has already been formed in a prior historic process; its phases appear as implying and reflecting into one another, for we know the outcome in advance.

This conception of evolution expresses succinctly the limitation in pragmatism's understanding of the biological model in the evolution of thought, the limits imposed by the lack of sense for evolution taking place in the historic dimension. History becomes a history, which can be so far placed outside oneself in the manner of a specimen that it can seem meaningful to say that its reality is just its growth as a whole. But this views evolution through the wrong end of the spyglass. Haeckel's law states that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, that the pattern of development in the parental stock is repeated in the individual. It is plain at least for an animal embryo that ontogeny is simply the condensed and abridged version of a process whose meaning becomes clear only when we spread it out into a continental environment and into geologic time. We have sought to indicate in the first section of this treatment that the same is true for thought. It is for that reason that the ontogenetic model of "individual experience" is inadequate, and Professor Dewey's attempt (in the social and political context) to make the creative advance in society and history simply the sum of individual human activities of "inquiry" in fact reverses the order of reality. The same will hold true for the detail of the (ontogenetic) evolution of individual experience, which Dewey calls "the pattern of inquiry." We have, correspondingly, the decisive criticism of Dewey's view that the order of nature

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<sup>1 23,</sup> Logic.

is not as such logical until it has been taken up into individual "inquiry." It is not, however, necessary ab extra to pursue Dewey into these questions. Though pragmatism as a whole does not get beyond the limits of the ontogenetic model here indicated, it does undergo a certain further development, which has the importance of revealing (although often only as anticipation) both the limits of the model and what it must become to reach the truth — the phylogenetic or historical model. This further development is carried out by Dewey's colleague in the Chicago school, George Herbert Mead.

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This truly remarkable figure, who expresses in his temperament and work the greatest merits and sharpest paradoxes of the indigenous American mentality, has not received even a small fraction of the attention which his intrinsic importance warrants. The fact that he is little known by comparison with James or Dewey is partly conditioned by the fact that during his life he published no complete book (those bearing his name having been assembled by his colleagues after his death in 1931). That in itself, however, has its source in the man's temperament, which is illumined by Dewey when he says that Mead was unwilling to publish because he was constantly engaged in reworking his ideas. Dewey further remarks that Mead appeared to have little awareness of the importance of his own ideas as against those of others, and preferred to attach his conceptions to existing currents rather than to announce them as original. The curious sort of humility which can be seen in the most original of American cultural figures (it is visible already in the temperament of Henry Thoreau over against that of Emerson) is in evidence in this. But it achieves a new dimension. In Mead's work there does not appear the contrast which is visible between the William James of the Psychology and the William James of the Will to Believe, etc. The former aspect is predominant; Mead published no popular lectures on pragmatism. The same exceptional — sympathetic — capacity to occupy the perspectives of others appears, but it is now weighted on the inward rather than the outward side. Instead of the special character of the work becoming diluted and lost in an identification with the work of others, as with James, it is retained, but takes on as cover or protective coloration, or framework, the ideas of others. Mead's ideas become a sort of cuckoo's egg within the philosophic work of his contemporaries, which appears to be like the rest until it is thought through — the egg is hatched. His interests were broad: general biology, physiological psychology and the study of the origin of language, the history of science and its metaphysics and cosmology. There is a distinct resemblance to that sort of thinker which is called "universal," but under the special warp of American conditions. There are many steps between these fields of interest, but they are as it were selected in such a way as to mirror what is critical in many other fields. This curious condensation, like the other traits of the man's mind, is of interest because it brings to expression the essential character of the authentic indigenous American mind. That is the embryonic character of that mind, which has never recognised itself and been recognised at the broader levels of the life, never come to realisation — as the extraordinary obscurity of a figure of the calibre of Mead clearly shows. It is the product of the combined development in the inner current of thought, which, as a national mind, did not (and could not) break its integument and get born.

Mead's career commenced with an interest in physiological psychology

and went over into a study of language and symbols. When "experience" has been rescued from the traditional interpretation in terms of static sensations and understood as the active experience of the animal organism in its environment, the problem arises of tracing the development of distinctively human experience with its "ideas," etc., out of the animal. Darwin had interpreted the gestures of animals as the expression of their emotions. Wilhelm Wundt further pointed out that animals evolve ways of gesturing by reason of the effect of their gestures on other animals, and thus that the function of these gestures is social. Communication and language are dependent upon the gesture's having the same effect (signifying the same) to the animal which makes it as to the other animal to which it is directed. This is the root idea from which Mead sets out. But, he indicates, Wundt's account is inadequate, because the situation most widespread in organic nature is one in which the gesture does not have this effect: the cry of the predator does not frighten the predator, but only his prey.

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"The difficulty is that Wundt presupposes selves as antecedent to the social process in order to explain communication within that process, whereas, on the contrary, selves must be accounted for in terms of the social process, and in terms of communication; and individuals must be brought into essential relation within that process before communication, or the contact between the minds of different individuals, becomes possible . . . communication is fundamental to what we term 'mind'; and it is precisely in the recognition of this fact that the value and advantage

of a behaviouristic account of mind is chiefly to be found."1

The "essential relation" of organisms is the actual common existence of herding or tribal animals of a single kind. In this situation that gesture which is in its nature most nearly the same for the organism which makes it and the organism to which it is directed is the vocal gesture, the cry, which becomes the significant symbol of spoken language: the animal cannot see

his own visage but he can hear the sound which he utters.

The situation in which language arises, in which the organism has the gesture in two ways, as uttering it and as hearing it, is also the origin of the human self, of self-consciousness. If the organism not only utters cries, but listens to them, heeds his own cry of fear as he might heed that of another, the duality comes into prominence, the speaker is divided from the listener within a single organism. If the organism hears the cries of others, and takes to them not only the attitude of the listener, response, but also the attitude of he who utters, this organism in responding capacity has become object to himself, object to his own attitude in uttering capacity. In so far as the individual takes the attitude of the others in communication with him toward himself as individual organism he becomes a self. It is plain that as language develops in the individual organism, others, first of all the parents, have the "decisive voice." The author's account is summed up in saying that the individual is an other before he is a self and a self only in so far as he is an other. The situation which exists prior to the appearance of mind and self is the interaction of "others," real social intercourse; mind and self are the bringing within the individual organism of this situation, which in the first instance existed objectively in the common life of many organisms, in society. How mind arises, the cell out of which the world of thought is built, is described as follows:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>49-50, Mind, Self, and Society, by G. H. Mead, Univ. Chicago Press, 1934.

"The logical structure of meaning is to be found in the threefold relationship of gesture to adjustive response and to the resultant of the given social act. Response on the part of the second organism to the gesture of the first is the interpretation — and brings out the meaning — of that gesture, as indicating the resultant of the social act which it initiates, and in which both organisms are thus involved. The basis of meaning is thus objectively there in social conduct, or in nature in relation to such conduct. Meaning is the content of an object which is dependent upon the relation of an organism or group of organisms to it. It is not essentially or primarily a psychical content . . . the adjustive response of the other organism is the meaning of the gesture."

The point of view is thus "social behaviourism," which position may be condensed: "Mind is the individual importation of the social process," and correspondingly, "Thought is a social intercourse with the self." In the fact that the great majority of people understand by behaviourism Watson's version which interprets human behaviour in terms of reflexes we see the same phenomenon in American culture which leads them to take James' lectures for pragmatism. This, however, is the classic form of behaviourism (to be found in Mead's book Mind, Self and Society). The scheme detailed here is in fact a condensed dialectic, a sort of logical cell of thought, which proceeds from the initial gesture (corresponding to the first term of the Hegelian triad, Being-in-self), to the response, its mediation, and absorbing this response into itself, comes back to immediacy as significant,

as the meaningful language symbol.

The decisive difference with Dewey may be found here. For Dewey also,2 experience and thought are social, dependent upon society. But with him society only sets the problem, so to speak, for individual acts of "inquiry." "Meanings," arising out of past "inquiries" (which are "the sequence of judgments constituting the body of knowledge ")3 come into the environment and modify it for human experience. But in Mead's recognition that the pattern of thought, that which takes place in the mind, exists as such outside the mind and outside the individual act before it exists in the mind, is contained the key to the difference. It contains implicitly the necessary criticism of Dewey's view that the pattern of occurrences in experience is not yet logical prior to being taken up into individual inquiry. Since the pattern which comes into thought first exists in society itself, and not in thought only, this pattern must develop. "Meanings" cannot be only the product of the sum of the activities of individual minds as such, containing the whole process in themselves, it must also develop in the social process. Thus Mead's work tends to go over from the study of molecular "experience" into the study of the process of society itself: in other words to go over from ontogeny to phylogeny; it is for this reason that Mead is the decisive figure in the later development of pragmatism's evolutionary model. The shift is strikingly analogous to the shift in the history of organic evolution from the Lamarckian to the Darwinian phase, in which the conception of evolution taking place within the life of the individual organism as selfcontained is supplanted by the conception of different mutants arising in different parts of the whole life of the species, and combining to bring forth

1 80-81, ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 256.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Chapter III of his Logic.

new forms - a process which cannot be represented except within a broad

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The tendency to move the process outward, to enlarge the focus within which the evolutionary process is seen, characterises Mead's work. It is, however, not complete; but only a tendency. The centre of attention becomes not "experience" so much as "society," but the limit appears in the preoccupation with a confined part of society and its history — the history of science. But the importance of this study, and the locus of the positive merit of behaviourism and pragmatism generally, lies in the fact that it does bring within the range of palpable immediate grasp, that range within which the cautious scientific mentality tends to stick, the real evolution which goes on. The inherent disadvantage of the classic formulation in German idealism of the evolution of thought and society had been that it leaped from the immediacy and particularity of experience (via the synthetic principles a priori, etc.) to the rational form conferred upon it by historical human activity on the broadest scale. If this evolution is consciously drawn to a historical model by Hegel, none the less that model remains something huge and distant from the sphere with which that cautious mentality can be acquainted, and the Hegelian dialectic remains for the natural sciences something belonging to Charles Peirce's "vast, unfathomable deep of ideas."

When behaviourism is applied to the object par excellence of science, the physical object, this conclusion comes to light: our knowledge of physical things is social in the same sense as our knowledge of other humans is such. Knowledge, as can be seen in the development of the child, starts out with the specifically social component predominant: the child depends very largely upon the parents for the supplying of his physical wants. He brings other things into awareness in the same way that he brings the attitudes of other human beings. The child in his play can be seen to take the "role" not only of parents, etc., but also of animals and of physical objects. The appearance of his self or mind depends upon his taking the role of these things towards himself, occupying the attitude of the "other." This "other" becomes very different from the individual human others; even here in the realm of specifically social relations we see, for example in the co-operative games of children, that the child must assume the attitude not of single others as such, but an attitude common to a number which is possible only for a number acting in conjunction. That is the "generalised other." What appears is that knowledge is never a simple and passive process, but always active, always involves a self-substitution within the activity proper to what comes into knowledge, which is then brought back into relation with the self. Even perception involves abstraction, and our knowledge of things is a knowledge of the common denominator of their activities.

"Physical things are perceptual things. They also arise within the act. This is initiated by a distant stimulus and leads through approximation or withdrawal to contact or the avoidance of contact. The outcome of the act is in consummation, e.g. as in eating, but in the behaviour of the human animal, a mediate stage of manipulation intervenes. The hand fashions the physical thing. The perceptual thing is fully there in the manipulatory area, where it is both seen and felt, where is found both the promise of contact and its fulfilment. . . . It is within this field of imple-

<sup>1 152</sup> et seq., ibid.

mental things picked out by the significant symbols of gesture, not in that of physiological differentiation, that the complexities of human society

have developed.1

This shows the same pattern found in language, taken now from the side of the thing. There it was the initial gesture, mediated by the response of the other organism, becoming meaningful; here it is the action initiated by the distant stimulus, mediated by the activities of contact, manipulation, which becomes "the perceptually real thing of the manipulatory area" (my emphasis): that is, that which is not only immediately seen, as is the thing at a distance, but has attached to it all the meanings which the operations of

handling confer.

The "manipulatory area" is a special case of what we have referred to in the first part of this treatment as the epicentre of the evolution of land-life. It is for human practical-technical activity what is also visible in the distribution of forms on the earth's surface. If we encounter at the epicentre of that activity the solid physical thing with its definitely known and measurable properties, distance qualities which have been correlated to "contact" characters (corresponding to the primary as against the secondary qualities of Locke), and at the periphery the region where undifferentiated "distance" qualities reign, we see the same in animal development, in which we find first on the scene the generalised animal, who is sentiently aware of a wide range of environmental sectors, at whose margins he inhabits, but which he does not actively master, only later evolving forms which do dominate there. It is thus that we may say that human technical practice recapitulates the development of the animals in mastering the physical world. But it further follows that this recapitulation has been here traced only through a somewhat limited range of the evolution. It is that under the eye and the hand, the "manipulatory area." But in the development of land-life, the feet, which carry the animal beyond the range of this area, come into prominence, and we achieve an extension of the pattern into a continental environment, in which the most primitive forms are found at the most remote points in space, at the geographic margins of the radiation, as in time, in the evolutionary past. This representation of the dialectic of the development of science in respect of its physical objects in terms of the "manipulatory area" is a characteristic product of the indigenous American mind, thrown back as it is on its own immediate field of experience, whose qualities become vivid. Therein it reflects also the characteristic warp of the whole of modern society, the concentration of whose activities has been within the limited range of specialised technical activities. In that lies the need to speak not merely of the operations of the hand, but of the total of human activities, whose most advanced forms radiate out, as do the animal, from epicentres of a continental environment. Yet even the terms in which the basic pattern was first expressed, those of Hegel's Logic, seem to reflect this immediate visual field. The development of the Idea from a remote point in time resembles the progress of our eye from a remote point in space to what is near at hand in the situation in which we find ourselves in nature, where we see at a distance the crudest and most elementary terms: Being, Nothing, Becoming, light and dark, the movements of the clouds; nearer at hand, the realm of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> 169-70, The Philosophy of the Present, Paul Carus Foundation Lectures, 3rd series, Chicago, Open Court, 1932, in the article there reprinted, "The Objective Reality of Perspectives."

Essence, the terrain with separable characters and configurations, qualities and quantities, trees, regions of foliage, the affair of enumeration and distinction, identities and differences; still nearer, accessible material things, Force and its Expression, reciprocal action, shaking of leaves, flow of water

and falling of stones.

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The physical thing of science is thus traced in its evolution under the eye and hand, and that evolution has proved to resemble that of animal organisms; the thing is represented first by the distance senses, something which we see or hear, and gains its reality and solidity as it is correlated to contact characters under tactual, manipulatory activity. So far the account is pragmatic, stated in terms of the place of the thing in human experience as active. But the special aspect which Mead's behaviourism adds to this account of pragmatic experience is its "social" nature. This means that in order to bring the thing back to our proper experience we place ourselves within it, occupy its perspective: we "know" it, become a mind or self, only in so far as we do this, in so far as we become an "other." The independence, the solidity of that which is "other" gains in emphasis. It is this analysis which conditions the development of Mead's ideas in the last phase of his intellectual career, whose motif is first clearly stated as a whole, so far as we are aware, in the article "The Objective Reality of Perspectives,"1 and is summed up in the four lectures making up the body of The Philosophy of the Present.2 This phase is set in motion by certain of the speculations of the English realist A. N. Whitehead (who had himself been influenced by William James) around the metaphysical implications of the new physics of relativity and quanta. This physics had raised the question of the redefinition of the ultimates of the physical world as conceived in the classic Newtonian terms — mass particles moving according to the laws of mechanics in an absolute space and time. Relativity had shown that the basic dimensions of everything which moves, its mass and its spatial measurements, themselves change in that motion, relative to that which is at rest. We are left nothing which is abiding or self-same, no absolute measure among things; each separate thing in nature varies in its essential characters relative to other things. In this situation, Whitehead, by use of the Minkowski mathematics which allows time to be treated as a spatial dimension, seeks to abstract from all change or happening a world of subsistent "events" existing in the four dimensional continuum of this mathematics. These plural, autonomous events, each establishes its own system of space and time. Whitehead suggests that these autonomous "percipient events," like animal organisms, may be considered to establish environments, or systems of space and time belonging to them. The enduring patterns or environments set up by the webs of such events are the space and time by which passing events are measured, and this system of organisms in their environments makes up the physical world as well as the organic. Whitehead's philosophy of (" percipient") " organism" is a species of objective idealism. In this system, however, the process by which we get from the hypothetical spacetime continuum to the space and time which we know, the means by which events gain the patterns ("eternal objects") which they have, remains unclear. It is called "ingression," and is ultimately laid to the action of God. Mead writes:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> 161 et seq.
<sup>2</sup> 1-90.

"What I wish to pick out of Professor Whitehead's philosophy of nature is this conception of an organisation of perspectives, which are there in nature. . . . They are not distorted perspectives of some perfect patterns, nor do they lie in consciousness as selections among things whose reality is to be found in a noumenal world. They are in their interrelationship the nature that science knows. Biology has dealt with them in terms of forms and their environments . . . the world of physical sciences is swept into the domain of organic environments, and there is no independent world of physical entities out of which the perspectives are merely selections."

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Here we see something like the classic development from Hume to Hegel. Physical relativity has destroyed the fixity or self-sameness of the Newtonian world of particles, and pushed reality so regarded back to the Minkowski world of featureless, dissevered "events." Whitehead proposes, like Kant, an organising principle; but this principle, "ingression," remains as mysterious as the "synthetic unity of apperception"; Mead's function is to emphasise, like Hegel, that the principle of organisation is just that of the

real world of natural history.

If we regard the elements of the inorganic world as "organisms," it is now possible to apply the behaviourist analysis of physical things as they arise in experience to these elemental things. Whitehead had proposed that since relativity and quantum theories had revealed elements of discontinuity in the formerly ultimate physical elements, that the basic nature of things is "process." For Mead, however:

"... we cannot really reduce things to processes, for it is not possible that processes should go on which are not processes of things, and measurements can only be made in a situation in which something abides irrelevant to time ... (if we attempt to do this) ... we have thus reversed the fundamental order of our experience and have made the 'what a thing is,' a

distance experience instead of a contact experience."2

(It is sometimes said, not entirely without justification, that the Chicago "functional" language, the vocabulary of which we have here a typical specimen, is barbarous. But for our part we prefer such expressions as the "whatit-is" of a thing in philosophic discussion to the time-worn coinage of "substance," "essence," "subsistence," etc.) In common experience, as in scientific practice, we see "something" at a distance. We approach it, touch it or identify it with what we are accustomed to handle, and we have discovered — what it is, or, in the Hegelian language, the truth of the thing. The quality which it possessed at a distance, as, e.g. its colour, has not disappeared, but has been tied down and correlated to other characters, those of contact and measurement. It has become "the perceptually real thing of the manipulatory area" (in the Hegelian terminology, Being-in-and-for-Self). Statement in terms of "process" and the like conveys only the indefinite shifting character of that which comes to our eye from a distance, where something is presumably going on, as to which, however, we are at the disadvantage that we do not yet know what it is.

"A similar criticism may be made of the view which would regard

energy as constituting the nature of the physical thing."3

<sup>1 163.</sup> 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> 144.

<sup>3 146.</sup> 

"... the same is true of fields of force. We may say that there are events, but there are no things to which the events happen at the location where

they are.

"I am not voicing a hankering after the fleshpots of what Whitehead has called the materialism of the Newtonian period. . . . I am only insisting that . . . we cannot get away from the perceptual findings that all science accepts as its most fundamental criterion of reality. The importance of the perceptually real thing of the manipulatory area appears when an object of this sort can be identified under observation and experiment in an exceptional instance; consider, for example, the radiation of the black bodies (in the quantum problem — A.E.B.) where the reality of the object as a perceptual thing must be accepted wholly in advance of any interpretation of it that a later hypothesis may give. Here we reach a something which maintains itself as an object that can be felt as seen . . . relate the assumed reality of a universe which goes way beyond the bounds of our perceptual experience to the decisive reality of the scientist's findings."

This provides likewise the criticism for the "operationalism" of Percy Bridgman, which would avoid direct reference to reality and represent it only in terms of operations of measurement and the like, and correspondingly,

for the conception which Dewey voices:

"A prediction, say, of an eclipse, is itself an if then proposition. If certain operations are performed, then certain phenomena having

determinate properties will be observed."2

This leaps over the "perspective," the active role of the thing itself, and in somewhat the same way as distance experience substitutes for it that by which we know it only indirectly, the "operations." Thus the "social" analysis of experience achieves its logical implications. We gain self and mind only so far as we occupy the perspective of the "other"; when this other (the perspective as objectively real) is extended to nature itself, the proposition becomes: knowledge is not knowledge of experiences or mental states, it is knowledge of things possessing an independent reality. Empiricism and pragmatism have implicitly reached their natural end in this; "experience" has become co-terminous in meaning with the relations the things of the entire physical world bear to one another; the implication is materialism. This implication and the decisive break in principle from Dewey comes out explicitly:

"There are qualities in nature which answer to other parts of nature, just as there are qualities in nature which answer to man's organic nature... In what sense shall we speak of the nature which existed before the advent of man? Dewey does not deal adequately with this problem (apparently the reference is to Experience and Nature, esp. Chap. 7—A.E.B.)... Man certainly arises in nature, and his experience is that

which belongs to nature itself."3

Whitehead, proposing to reduce ultimate reality to "process" and speaking of the "ingression of patterns" into the world as the result of the action of

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<sup>1 148-9.</sup> 

<sup>8 456,</sup> Logic.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> 642 in the volume *The Philosophy of the Act*, Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, 1938. This volume may be considered supplementary to *The Philosophy of the Present*; it is in reality the author's collected miscellaneous papers, though not complete as such.

God, had been in flight from the inexorable old riddle of causation, which had plagued philosophy since the Greek Eleatics: how it is possible to find more in effect than in cause. Since, with relativity it comes out that motion itself cannot take place without change in that which moves, and change itself implies a difference which is caused, in order to get back to a substratum which is simple and self-identical it is necessary to postulate a Minkowski world of events which abstracts from change by reducing time to a spatial dimension. From there speculation proceeds to consider the events as "organisms," whose inner side, their "process" and the way in which they are organised into the known world are equally inscrutable. "Ingression," however, is in no way better than mechanical causality. Eleatic metaphysics has not been avoided, and the organism idea so interpreted is a defeat and a movement backward for thought, not a movement towards elucidation of the process of nature. The Newtonian atomism in physics had in fact been accompanied by a parallel atomism in political life, the atomic "individualism" of the Enlightenment and Revolution. The atoms of physics were related to each other by external, mechanical connection, the human atoms by the external relations of self-interest (contract). But the ties of the human atom to the world receive a softer and more fluid interpretation in Rousseau and the Romantics, in which the bonds of feeling, sensibility, replace the external ones — a reaction from that cramping metaphysical imprisonment is involved. It is revealing to observe that it is in terms of such bonds ("feeling," "affection") that Whitehead comes to talk about the ties among the things of the physical world. Metaphysical causality comes back, but now as a carrying forward of the alleged fluid ultimate relations into the physical world which we know: the same identity of effect with cause flows back upon us as obscurantism. The relation of things to one another becomes like that of feeling individuals who see in others blank emotional, "psychological" qualities.

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But it is the merit of George Mead to perceive that it is of the fundamental nature of things that they should evolve; that we get at the reality or truth of things at the end of the process of our experience, and not by the metaphysical carrying forward of the more abstract ultimate situation with which we may begin. In the physical world we find "ultimately" not process, but "the perceptually real thing" (Being-in-and-for-Self). Science, pushing its way farther into nature, extends the area where such things may be isolated. The isolation of such things is the process in the experience of the scientist as he places himself within the (active) perspective of the physical object, and its outcome, "the perpetually real thing of the manipulatory area," is simply this physical object when it has been understood or mastered in its place in nature, it is its "nature" qua understood and qua lawful. When the characters of all such things in the natural world have been cancelled against each other, what is common among them has been abstracted out, what appears is a something which is separable from what happens to it, whose happening can be traced and plotted in definite space and time dimensions, as are the definite, tangible things of the epicentre of human practice, the manipulatory area. It is: matter in motion in space and time. These dimensions are the simple cellular form and ultimate common denominator of all those realms in which man can penetrate and master. They are, as Mead says, the ultimates of Democritean physics, beyond which we cannot go. It is characteristic of the so-to-say hidden subversive

character of Mead's ideas within the thought of his contemporaries (we commonly get such elucidations as the comment that *The Philosophy of the Present* is "simply" a pragmatic version of Whitehead's *Process and Reality*) that we here arrive back at just that Eleatic materialism which Whitehead sought so hard to escape. Rationalism as the dialectic development of the material thing from the bare somewhat revealed by distance-experience into the perceptually real thing of the manipulatory area here coincides entirely with materialism, which describes the fundamental traits of the *product* of that evolution. The material thing is not *merely* a something which exists outside of us in the objective world, but bears with it inextricably those traits first described by Democritus, which are the common denominator of the work of the dialectic of nature.

What in physical things makes this evolution possible? Relativism has apparently obliged us, in order to obtain the most accurate possible idea of the movement, e.g. of physical particles, to take account of the fact that in moving they change in spatial and energy dimensions. Mead's analysis seeks to disclose what we do in representing this situation to ourselves. It is a deceptively simple analysis, but it must be understood in the behaviourist context from which it is drawn; it is in truth the application in this realm of the scheme by which the evolution of mind or self in human experience was described. In representing the situation of the relativity of objects moving in relation to one another, we are saying in effect that the moving object, with its different space-time system, exists within the spacetime system of that which is at rest and within which we record its change, e.g. in mass. In this representation we are applying two space-time systems simultaneously. This, Mead alleges, is the real situation in nature. If we take the alternative, it begins to take on the appearance of a reductio ad absurdum. If, in the situation which relativity describes, we confine ourselves within one space-time system only, we must abstract from space and time, place ourselves in the perspective of an "event" in the hypothetical Minkowski world, and find our relation to other events only in transformation formulæ employing an elaborate mathematical apparatus. This situation is closely analogous to our relation in experience to that which is at a distance; these transformation formulæ bring other events to us in the same fashion as the distance senses bring their objects. But the Minkowski world is suppositious, and further, it assumes for the transformation formulæ a constant velocity for light. This obliges us to recognise that such perspectives in which we place ourselves are simply perspectives for the world of real perceptual experience, and it is to that that we are thrown back. Relativism has simply enabled us to grasp in these perspectives, not only what they are immediately, but also that which affects them from a distance, not only what they are in themselves, but what they are as affected by what is other, to employ the behaviourist term.

"Relativity reveals a situation within which the object must be con-

temporaneously in different systems to be what it is in either.2

"Newtonian relativity permitted the observer to transfer himself from one system to another . . . electromagnetic relativity exhibits results within our system which compel us to have recourse to the other system to account for them. . . . It is this break in what I have called the

2 63, ibid.

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<sup>1</sup> In particular in the last two essays in The Philosophy of the Present, 47-90.

correlations between differences of space and time in different systems which reveals in the perceptual world that sociality in nature which has generally been confined to thought."

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Sociality here bears the meaning of simultaneous existence in different

systems.

"... can a thing with changing spatio-temporal and energy dimensions be the same thing with different dimensions, when we have seemingly only these dimensions to define the thing? It has seemed simpler to say that the real thing lies behind these experiences which are subjective and phenomenal. But let us instead accept passage (i.e. real change — A.E.B.) as the character of reality, and recognise that in passage there is a change in the structure of things, and that because of passage objects can occupy

different systems."2

"Passage" has no other meaning than Hegel's "Becoming," and derives out of the stuff of the relativity physics the same answer that Hegel gave to the ancient riddle of causation: that Becoming is the character of reality. Sociality, the notion that all things are not only what they immediately are (present in a given space-time system), but also other (present in other spacetime systems) has the same content as Hegel's "contradiction." philosophic position which is thus arrived at, in the course of the undertaking to present adequately the conclusions of the relativity physics, can be designated by no other name than dialectical materialism.3 Its original aspect and its value reside in the fact that the laws of the dialectic are discovered in another material (that of the biological model) from the historical material out of which Hegel derived them. This material, in spite of its limitations, proves exceptionally useful for the interpretation of physical science. The four Carus lectures forming the body of The Philosophy of the Present have the great intrinsic importance of containing a complete — and to our view substantially correct - interpretation of the physical nature of the relativity physics in dialectical terms. Pragmatism reaches its natural end here, it is fulfilled — and extinguished — as a special philosophy of experience; it could not go, and has not gone, farther except to go backward.

In the position which this book presents, however, can likewise be found the reasons that this fact has gone largely unrecognised; we may see also the embryonic character, the weakness and imperfect expression of this indigenous thought. The book's title expresses the limitation which the molecular model imposes on the treatment. The "present" is individual experience, within which reality appears, in the sense of William James:

"... the self is the Thought, the hook from which past selves dangle, planted firmly in the Present, which alone passes for real . . . thus keeping the chain from being a purely ideal thing. Anon the hook itself will drop into the past . . . and be appropriated by a new Thought in a

new Present."

The present of experience, however, has been extended to cover any conceivable coherent event in the natural world. In nature, as we have seen, it is social, i.e. it contains simultaneously more than one thing. In the dialectic

<sup>1 63-63.</sup> 

<sup>2 79</sup> 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> It must be remarked in this connection that Sidney Hook's recent description of a specimen of the philosophic production which assumes this title—"beneath contempt"— is justified, with trifling exceptions, for the whole of it since the Empirio-Criticism.

of passage, it becomes other, i.e. the new or novel enters into it. The appearance of this new element is "emergence." The very attempt to give it rational form brings out clearly the nature of the swindle of this "emergence," which is the idea of evolution in its most abstract possible form (it has also been attempted to prove that God himself "emerged" in nature). Thus Mead writes, picking appropriately the "stellar visitor" hypothesis of the

evolution of the solar system for the purpose of the illustration :

"in the passage from the past into the future the present object is both the old and the new, and this holds for its relations to all other members of the system to which it belongs. Before the approach to our sun of the stellar visitor, the portion of the sun which became the earth was determined in its character by its relationship to those portions of the sun's substance which became the other planets. As it is drawn out into its planetary position it retains this character. . . The point is that a body belonging to a system, and having its nature determined by relations to members of that system, when it passes into a new systematic order will carry over . . . something of the nature of all members of the old. So in the history of a community, the members carry over from an old order their characters as determined by social relations. . . . So Rousseau had to find both sovereign and subject in the citizen, and Kant had to find both the giver of the moral law and the subject of the law in the rational being."

The "emergent" is, like the stellar visitor, the "novel" or unexpected, which comes into the old situation. The dialectical movement based on the social nature of reality is a passage from one thing to its "other." It is a dyadic or two-fold pattern of movement, not, as with Hegel, triadic: the passage of a thing does not lead, as with the latter, into its "opposite," but

into something less definite, its other. Thus in reference to Hegel:

"From the Hegelian standpoint the particular is in opposition to the universal and as such it is false . . . there is no place in the dialectic for that which answers to the exception. It is perfectly true that such data get their reality, their truth, from the standpoint of a later inter-

pretation."

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Mead has grasped the vastly important difference between concrete and abstract universals. But the grasp of the dialectic is warped just by the misunderstanding of particularity. The other two terms of the Hegelian triad, original abstract being (Being-in-self), and finished or elaborated being, which has returned to simplicity but which contains the process of mediation within it (Being-in-and-for-Self), appear clearly in the dialectic which is employed in explaining the basis of language (the mediating term in the development of meaning is the response on the part of the other organism an organism other and so to say "equal"), and in the idea of the perceptual reality of the manipulatory area as against its distance characters. Yet the " passage of the past into the future" in which "the present object is both the old and the new," leaps this inordinately long gap. Inevitably the new takes on the appearance of the "emergent" or "novel." The truth is that the author, as in the case of all pragmatists, is stuck at the second moment of the triad, just this particularity, which corresponds to the perspective of the molecular individual in society, and restricts insight into evolution

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> 51-52, The Philosophy of the Present. <sup>2</sup> 634, The Philosophy of the Act.

within the confines of the ontogenetic, molecular model. The first and third of the triadic terms can be reflected into this perspective, can be set beyond oneself, but one cannot get outside of particularity, occupy the perspective of the other terms, in order that this particularity should appear objectively. The emergent conception in evolution in itself reflects this same limitation. It is the situation of the naturalist who is pinned down to one spot in nature. where he sees, let us say, a new form arise. The form goes forth beyond his vision, spreads into the length and breadth of the world to meet its destiny, and what it undergoes in the process he does not see. It comes back and confronts him thus modified, and the change inescapably appears to him in the form of "emergence," i.e. a leap from one quality to another. naturalist, excavating in one pit, finds first the shellfish, then the reptile, then the mammal in successive strata. Noting the similarities, he may rightly connect these forms in evolution, observe a "continuity" in Professor Dewey's sense. But gaps remain. It is only when we are able to occupy the universal, the broadest possible perspective - which for organic life means simply to deal in terms of the world environment - that this leap between qualities disappears, that organic quality (new form) turns completely around into quantity (spreads throughout the world), and then gives rise

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again to other qualities. In the inability to do this lies the root of pragmatism's limitation. Here is the point at which it runs into the sands — the limit of the molecular model. Dewey's "continuity" is a legitimate description of the sort of connection which the "emergent" in evolution requires for its conditions; it makes the limit explicit. It is the broadest — and emptiest — possible abstraction of the organic connection which evolution expresses in the historic dimension. In the extensive use which Dewey makes of it, it becomes a bare interconnectedness or co-implication of things, the mere abstract cement by which the plural things of the world are tied together, whether one follows the connection backward, forward or edgewise in the evolutionary order. In the leap between qualities which the emergent conception supplies they become severed from one another, and the assertion that continuity " excludes complete rupture on one side and mere repetition of identities on the other," a kind of diagram of what the truth might look like, does not advance our knowledge and appears as mere equivocation or eclecticism - "mind and matter." The subjective side of this ambiguity flows back as the ideative or moral quality, from which building-stone Dewey has constructed the most lamentable part of his intellectual edifice in ethics, politics and historical criticism (including a small book which makes the "moral" or spiritual qualities of authoritarianism of the Germans actively responsible for their adoption" of militarism and subsequently fascism). Here pragmatism, as with James at another level, loses its special character — but this side does not concern us here.

Such is our starting point in the first section of this treatment. If we set about to repair the weakness of pragmatism's biological analogy for thought, it becomes apparent that we must deal with biological history as Hegel dealt with philosophical, as world-history. In that we see that the historical (phylogenetic) model for evolution, taken from European history, is necessarily the classical and decisive one. At each evolutionary level the forms which arise spread forth and, subject to mechanical collisions conditioned basically only by the shape of the cage in which the names are shaken, give

rise by natural selection to the organic matrix and to new forms. As the generalised creature becomes more and more important the development at this level accelerates and comes to a focus, till finally a single highly generalised species, man, achieves the capacity to specialise by means of external instrumentalities rather than physiologically, develops language, and enters upon the domain of recorded history. It is now plainly visible that the Hegelian and Darwinian versions of evolutionary process can be joined, or, more positively, that it is no longer possible to keep them apart. The exact point of juncture can be located, in the section "Observation of Organic Nature," in the *Phenomenology of Mind* (the same spot where certain critics have discovered that Hegel had no apprehension of organic evolution):

"If the genus had the different parts within itself as an unbroken simple unity, so that its simple negativity as such were at the same time a movement, carried on through parts equally simple and directly universal in themselves . . . then the organic genus would be consciousness

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ns ed "If in the logical process of the moments involved in organic embodiment the mediating term, which contains the species and its realisation in the form of a single individuality, had within it the two extremes of inner universality and universal individuality, then this middle term would have, in the movement of its reality, the expression and the nature of universality, and would be self-systematising development. It is thus that consciousness takes as middle term between universal spirit and its individuation or sense consciousness the system of shapes assumed by consciousness as an orderly self-constituted whole of the life of the spirit . . which is dealt with in this treatise, and which finds its objective existential expression as the history of the world. But organic nature has no history; it drops from its universal — life — immediately into the individuation of existence . . " (326).

Besides the fact, then, that reason in observing organic nature only comes to see itself as universal life in general, it comes to see the development and realisation of this life merely by way of systems distinguished quite generally, in the determination of which the essential reality lies not in the organic as such, but in the universal individual (the earth) . . . in relating the organic to the different facts of the inorganic, elements, zones, climates, so far as regards law and necessary connection, observation

never gets farther than the idea of a 'great influence' "(326-7).

The "observation" of Darwinism gets a great deal farther and makes possible the lawful, necessary connection of the inorganic "universal individual" with the organic in the pattern of geographic radiation on the earth's surface. The single pole of radiation, the Holarctic area, brings out, as the generalised form gains in importance, a single species which dominates the rest. Infinitely more important than the arbitrary allegation that "organic nature has no history" is the fact that Hegel's speculation here seeks to reach back of consciousness to a hypothetical "mediating term," containing both "inner universality and universal individuality" (organic generalisation and specialisation), which points at something real, the generalised organic creature, who gives rise to the human form which is both generalised and specialised. Indeed Hegel's Logic (a natural history of generalised ideas) exhibits just such a development. It progresses from

external and brittle categories, Diversity, Essence, Quality and Quantity, like the beetle and the fern, the multiform indefinitely divided world of insect and spore, down to Universality, Individuality, which, in spite of greater simplicity and sphericity, seem to start forth from themselves in all directions with an inner force, as little self-contained in that simple form as a

poised wing or tensed muscle beneath its coat of fur.

Man is both generalised and specialised animal, and the whole variety which is found in the diversity of organic creatures he possesses in "ideas," which we may define in the behaviourist sense, not as something subjective, but as the names for different habits, practices, techniques, which are implicated in the environment with instrumentalities, tools, materials. The continuity with the organic world exists on the historical level. How, then, does human evolution go forward? Pragmatism has spoken of the evolution of "individual experience," whose mature form is "inquiry." Yet this inquiry is an abstraction. It is as if we were to say for organic forms that what evolves is just the general organism-in-itself, whether bird, fish, dog, whose various evolutions are all reducible to a general organic "inquiry." We have no difficulty, however, for organic forms, in saying that the lion evolves, and the lamb evolves, and that their evolution is describable in terms of the specific environment in which they exist. What corresponds to this in human society? Here enters the fact that man is both specialised and generalised animal. We cannot describe human society to the model of Spencer's ineffable piece of "evolutionary" clockwork, in which the shoemakers or the mechanics are, like organic species, separated from their fellows. Men practice different trades, successively or simultaneously, at the most separated parts of the social mechanism. Even in one trade, overnight, with the introduction of new machines, they may leap a gap literally analogous to the leap between reptile and mammal in organic development. diversity in these accidental intersections of the realms of social function into the life of the individual cancels out this individual as the unit of description. If we do speak in these terms, we have not grasped, in Mead's term, the what-it-is that evolves. It is this that forces us back, as the similarity of the Hegelian categories to organic forms suggests, to absolute idealism. If this is understood behaviouristically, it is possible to see that it is these ideas (not only generalised but also specialised), bodies of social practice and technique, together with the tools and instrumentalities that correspond to them, which evolve in human society just as in the organic world. The full extent of the historic continuity with the organic becomes apparent.

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The advance of human society, then, is literally analogous to the spread of newer organic forms, arising at the epicentres of the environment, into the peripheral regions inhabited by older forms. In evolution the more advanced organic forms are those which are more generalised, which bring within the command of the individual organism more diverse, larger spheres of the environment, and they push out less advanced, more specialised forms, who embrace small spheres. These new forms, however, must in their own fashion master and bring within themselves the same environment which the older commanded in their greater division, specialisation and diversity; in that sense they recapitulate the older development. It is thus with the development of ideas in human society. What is called "thought" in human life, in particular the disciplined thought, science, is just this recapitulation, involving greater mastery, of what humanity had previously

adapted to in an older, less conscious fashion, the elements of the situation which science illumines impinging on men in less connection and with greater brute impact. This, we must interject, allows us to make a decisive criticism of Professor Dewey's view of logic, which declares that the relations which thought investigates in its material are prior to that investigation not yet logical. The truth in this comes down to the fact that the connection in this material is not yet wholly that which is the upshot of inquiry, when it will presumably be more completely illumined, more closely connected, etc. But the structure which exists prior to the investigation has as close a resemblance to that which exists after it as the older organic form has to the new which replaces it, and in respect of that structure its development recapitulates the older.

The fact that for pragmatism logical pattern is conceived to arise only within individual experience conditions the failure of pragmatic liberalism to get hold of the logical in the development of society itself, and therewith the conditions of mastering the process in society. This side Dewey expresses

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"... social inquiry must satisfy the conjoint conditions of observational ascertainment of fact and of appropriate operational conceptions... Until social inquiry succeeds in establishing methods of observing, discriminating and arranging data that evoke and test correlated ideas, and until, on the other side, ideas formed and used are (1) employed as hypotheses, and are (2) of a form to direct and prescribe analytic-synthetic determination of facts, social inquiry has no chance of satisfying the

logical conditions for the attainment of scientific status."

Mead sticks essentially at the same place, when, attempting to apply to society itself the pattern of investigation which natural science displays, he repeats the words of the old song: a particular issue must be found, possible rational methods for its solution posed, agreement achieved. . . . An attempt to carry over the method by which the advance of the natural sciences may be represented is visible in this. Mead attaches paramount importance in the activity of the scientist to the situation in which he, surveying his field of work, discovers "the exception" to existing law, and seeks to bring this exceptional case under law again by the employment of

hypotheses and experiments.

But the truth is that this method is simply the broader pattern of evolution enormously condensed. The condensation resembles that of developmental stages which is found in the animal embryo. Man possesses an advantage over his fish-like or ape-like ancestors in that he has got beyond the fish or the ape; but the form in which his phylogenetic history is crammed into embryonic development is none the less a less instructive text than that real extended history. The evolution of physical science is in fact the recapitulation, in that compressed form which is the whole incalculable advantage of the human mode of evolution, of the development of organic forms in overcoming certain problems at the physical level If the mechanic seeks to make a device to accomplish a certain purpose, the evolution of his attempt does not follow the same course as that of organic forms in overcoming the same problem. A new organic form arises at the epicentre of the environment, the place of greatest variegation, where nature displays her traits and aws in greatest ramification. This corresponds to the point in

<sup>1 491,</sup> Logic.

thought or investigation at which not only existing known and accepted law or condition of nature appears, but additional characters, which present themselves as the exception. Here arises the new generalised form, the hypothesis. In human investigation, it does not require to spread into every corner of the environment in order to reveal the limits of its detailed application under the assumption of the uniformity of nature, all that is condensed into relatively few critical experiments, which eliminate it or revise it, inform it with new evidence, and give it its finished form as part of the body of scientific law. The key fact, which George Mead overlooks when he declares that the dialectic has no place for the exception, is that thought has imposed the yoke of universal, necessary law upon nature; it watches the whole extent of the world for but a single, fugitive exception to those great, grey, iron laws, ready to rush there instantly, instruments in hand. It has thus reversed the plight of the animal, upon which the environment imposes its brutal reign.

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But it is evident that the mode of evolution of human society grades off sharply from this state of affairs prevailing in physical science, until in the most backward province of human activity, that of society itself, the purely animal pattern prevails. Here the environment forces itself upon men just as it imposes itself upon the brute: if we do not impose law upon nature it visits it upon us; instead of "exceptions" or irrationalities being scarce, fugitive, the object of our search, they are omnipresent, press upon us from every side and poison our life—it is an age of monsters, in which the truth

itself lives in the trees and burrows.

If we ask the question how are we to apply science to the study of society itself? we may first correctly pose the question when we recognise that we have before us this lawful gradation of evolutionary stages, retreating from epicentre of the most advanced form of human thought and practice in physical science, until at the margin, just as with organic forms upon the earth's surface, are found the forms least advanced in the evolutionary scale. Existing society has this further peculiarity, of which we see the anticipation in natural history in the eras of high specialisation of forms, that the most advanced level of practice, the technical and industrial, is at the periphery of the region of central concern for men, their own society and life; thus modern life, as has been fairly often correctly noted, resembles a sphere which is hollow at its centre. It is in classical form the precondition for the arising of a new generalised form on the adaptive level. All the lines which we may extend from the whole variety of advanced forms of specialised scientific and technical practice can be brought to intersection at this central point. Here pragmatism and its blind "hypotheses," "analyticsynthetic determination of facts," etc., appears at its weakest. For thought as such, the "hypothesis," in its function of recapitulation, consists first of all in reconstructing and placing oneself within the older evolutionary situation in order to find the road in which new forms must develop. And each of the whole vast variety of specialised human activities can lead us back to a detail of this central situation, till the least scientific of men, beaten from above, below, front, back, and either side, must finally form at least the "hypothesis" that he is being struck.

To bring into view the original of which the condensed and foreshortened ontogenetic scheme of "inquiry" is merely the copy we grasp this central situation, real existing society. It is a huge, highly detailed and symmetrical

structure, bound by the long lines of historic continuity in a tight, absolutely lawful web, its evolution proceeding on a world-scale, stemming from the Holarctic-European centre just as natural history before it. It is world history; immensely complex and highly flexible, but displaying throughout the most weighty necessary connections, to which breaks in that web, fortuities, are foreign. Though pragmatism never grasps this model, an anticipation, which indicates clearly the direction in which it is necessary to move, is to be found in George Mead's ideas in the last part of his life. His whole intellectual career, starting from the endeavour to interpret individual experience as "social," points to the intellectual compensation, which the experience of the molecular American "individual," as it becomes conscious, seeks to make in order to escape its isolation. The dialectic which develops when this molecular experience is taken as model proves exceptionally useful in interpreting evolution in physical science at the inorganic level. He writes in reference to Whitehead that the useful part of the latter's philosophy of nature is its "Leibnizian filiation . . . his conception of the perspective as the mirroring in the event of all other events." Such events, as we have seen, are extended in meaning to include the particles of inorganic nature. Mead writes:

"Organisms which act mechanically upon one another may bring about a higher organism if the processes in the different organisms are in some measure identical, so that they have a common perspective. . . .

The common perspective tends to complete itself."1

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ntral trical The implications of this are not made explicit, and must be drawn out. Nature is organised into various levels; at each level matter is composed of nearly identical units — the atoms of a given element, the molecules of a given compound, and likewise, the members of a given organic species the structure of each unit reflects that of all the others at that level. The theory expressed, then, that "The common perspective tends to complete itself," posits a stage in, e.g. nebular evolution, in which a situation, say, of a given range of temperature, pressure, etc., is characterised by a less definite organisation of elemental particles than that found in the presence of a homogeneous element, and that this situation arises out of it: the evolution is an evolution into similar particles, each of which reflects the structure of all the others — the "common perspective" which tends to complete itself. The relation of these particles is social, and at that level they constitute a society. If we extend this pattern forward, we find (as is indicated in the first part of this treatment) something similar in organic evolution in the increasing dominance of generalised animals. The most striking hypothesis which appears in the last part of Mead's work is the extension of this form of development to human society. The implications of this idea are clearly sketched in an article written not long before the author's death, "Internationalism and International-Mindedness," which possesses the great importance of marking the point of extinction of indigenous American thought as a national philosophy or thought. It is written around James' The Moral Equivalent of War, and takes as its thesis that, because of the destructiveness of modern war, society can no longer be organised on merely national terms, but must become international.

"Society is an interaction of . . . selves, and an interaction that is possible only if out of their diversity unity arises. . . . Society is unity

1 640, The Philosophy of the Act.

in diversity. However, there is always present the danger of miscarriage. There are two sources of its unity — the unity arising from the interconnection of all the different selves in their self-conscious diversity, and that arising from the identity of common impulses.'

But since modern war destroys nations themselves, patriotism as the unity against a common enemy in war, arising merely from "the identity of common impulses," can no longer be rational; it belongs to this latter,

negative unity.

"Another catastrophe may be necessary before we cast off the cult of warfare, but we cannot any longer think our national life in terms of warfare. . . . It follows that if we do not think our national and international life, we can no longer depend upon war for the fusion of disparate and opposing elements in the nation. We are compelled to reach a sense and opposing elements in the nation. of being a nation by means of rational self-consciousness.

"... There is only one solution to the problem, and that is in finding

the intelligible common objects, the objects of industry and commerce, the common values in literature, art and science. . . . But all these values are at first divisive. They at first appear as individual and class interests . . . the process of civilisation is the discovery of these common ends . . . they come to mean not opposition, but diverse occupations and activities. Difference of function takes the place of hostility of interest. activities. Difference of function takes the place of mostling, "... The Great War has posed the problem before contending nations of carrying civilisation into the community of nations; that is, it has left

The expression to "think" international life appears weak, because "thought" inescapably carries with it the traditional connotations of subjective-ineffectuality. But it has been the whole work of behaviourism "thought" inescapably carries with it the traditional connections of subjective-ineffectuality. But it has been the whole work of behaviourism to connect thought with nature. The connection has been extended even back into the inorganic, and "thought" or "international-mindedness" here is that same "common perspective" whose completion is the principle of evolution at all levels. We are far less concerned with the anonymous liberal "we" to whom this analysis is directed, that they should "bear it in mind" (it includes all men of goodwill, including the better half of the willing officialdom) than with the discovery of the common principle in In mind (it includes all men of goodwill, including the better hair of the ruling officialdom), than with the discovery of the common principle in human and pre-human evolution. It has been seen that through this "common perspective" in human society, "international-mindedness," pass the great vectors of natural necessity; though Mead was far from clearly aware of it, he here had his hand on the lever of history. It is the return out of exile of the American "individual," who comes back at last in ideas to the international society which in fact made him what he was, and comes back with new powers, a grasp on the nature of that society, which thought has made its own. This discovery explains a trait of Mead's ideas which has so puzzled some of his students, the (entirely justified) towering optimism and confidence in human and scientific progress, which is so rare and has so strange a sound in the modern context.

The incompleteness, the embryonic character of the ideas here expressed, however, is visible in the sociology of "attitude" and "impulse" in which this is cast. Such psychological qualities, in the form of "moral choice" on the part of individuals and the like, pervade pragmatism's, especially Dewey's, views on politics and society in the years which have passed since

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encyclopedic philosophic system, yet not only philosophy, but science, art, psychology, politics as well. That is the truth of pragmatism, and its future In his article on American thought which we have cited in part in the beginning of this treatment, George Mead writes a summary estimate of the philosophy in whose establishment he played so considerable a role :

"We refer to this as individualism, perhaps uncouth, but unafraid there is only one way in which such an individualism can be brought there is only one way in which such an individualism can be brought under constructive criticism, and that is by bringing the individual to state his ends and purposes in terms of the social means he is using. You cannot get at him with an ethics from above, you can reach him by an ethics which is simply the development of the intelligence implicit in his act. . . . John Dewey's philosophy . . . is the developed method of that implicit intelligence in the mind of the American community. And for such an implicit intelligence there is no other test for hypotheses except that they work. In the profoundest sense John Dewey is the except that they work. In the profoundest sense John Dewey is the philosopher of America."

Beneath the bland tone of this article, the content seethes; it declares in effect that except insofar as inward, implicit intelligence has been given philosophic form, America has no philosophy. That is true, but that "implicit intelligence" is an embryo which never came to social birth. The inaccessibility of the indigenous American mind to an external critique is doubtless over-estimated; but we can afford to accept Mead's estimate, for no one has contributed more than he to the conclusive proof, drawn not from an external critique, but from its own, immanent development, that the truth of pragmatism lies beyond itself.

### Papal Bull

Rome, May 21st (Reuters).-Pope Pius condemned sterilisation, birth control and surgical operations at childbirth to save the mother's life at the expense of the child in an address to several hundred surgeons.

"Not even for supposedly scientific purposes can sterilisation or other interventions offensive to the dignity and efficiency of the human creature be admitted," the Pope told surgeons from thirty-two nations attending the International Surgical Congress in Rome.

"The surgeon, in his sublime mission, must never forget that the subject of his intervention is not any kind of being but man with all read's activitient."

of his intervention is not any kind of being but man, with all man's spiritual

characteristics."

this article, and convey clearly the fact that from this point pragmatism can only develop backward. Pragmatism is not, within the narrower frame of reference, subjectivistic or idealistic. Within the limits of its model of individual experience (within which the epistemological problem has ordinarily been posed), it has considerable claims to a naturalistic or materialistic theory of knowledge. But this confinement to the molecular model reproduces point for point in reference to society at the broader level the fallacies of subjectivism, the "individual" taking the place of the subjective mind, and his moral qualities the place of autonomous psychological faculties. Pragmatism does not, in spite of the important anticipation on the part of George Mead, occupy the perspective or the universal terms of evolutionary development in society—and in that lies the final and decisive expression of the fact that it is the last, best possible expression a national mind, which, however, could never come to birth as a national ind. There is reason for that, which we can here only suggest: America not a nation in the European sense. The decisive tendency of its thought" down to the present has been to achieve the lowest common nominator of its human and cultural constituent European elements, he "psychological" residue in American thought is its constitutional eakness; and hardier European forms (even though they be mere distegration products) push it out and orphan it. Psychology, in particular epidemic — psychoanalytic — form, comes into America, and like propean liquor and social diseases previously, ravages the population and wallows up not only pragmatism and behaviourism, but thought in general. But behaviourism, when drawn out to its logical (historical) implications, moves not only consciousness, as it has correctly proposed, but also - in is the same sense — the individual as well, as any sort of concrete element in the social process. When mind has been fully understood as part of natural evolution it will be clear that the mental "qualities" find their entire meaning spread out quantitatively beyond themselves in the environment, and that if we stick at any intermediate point and regard these qualities as they are in themselves, we have committed the same error as those who would make energy the nature of physical particles: "we have reversed the fundamental order of our experience and have made the what-a-thing is a distance experience instead of a contact experience." We can only know the truth of organic or mental qualities, without being left with any further qualitative tokens on our hands, however, if we follow them to the full extent of their quantitative expansion, into the widest possible environ-ment. Materialism is environmentalism, and it returns decisively only when be environment is understood as world-environment. Pragmatic pluralism" becomes monism, which occupies the perspective of the picentre of human society, the "common perspective" which tends to implete itself. Pragmatism becomes materialism, indigenous American ought is extinguished in internationalism. What is the "common perspecwhich is to be completed in the environment of ideative forms which society? It can only be an ideative organism, spreading into the environent of specialised human activities in the same way that man spread into e organic environment of older forms : an idea which, like man himself, at the same time specialised and generalised; which is all-sided, mastering branches only in organising them into the whole, and bringing out the niversal as the concrete expression of mastery of special realms.

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